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I.  INTRODUCTION  
“Notice pleading is dead,”1 stated Benjamin Spencer following the 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.2  When testifying before the 
United States Senate Judiciary Committee, Stephen Burbank offered a 
eulogy for notice pleading and proposed an amendment to return pleading to 
the way it was the day before the Twombly decision.3  But what was the 
pleading practice the day before Twombly?  What if, in the days before 
Twombly, pleading practice did not match the notice pleading standard as 
originally envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“the Federal Rules”)?  Legal and empirical scholars have extensively 
debated the potential effect of Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal4 on motion 
practice and pleading standards.5  However, very little research addresses 
what pleading practice was like in the days before Twombly. 
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1.  A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008).  
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
3. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong., app. A (2009) (prepared statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor 
for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56719/pdf/CHRG-111shrg56719.pdf. 
4. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
5. Commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal responded to 
growing concern over rising litigation costs, heavy case loads, and case management concerns. See 
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In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Conley v. Gibson,6 supported a lenient 
interpretation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, which requires that a complaint 
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.7  Under Conley, “fair notice” required that a complaint 
be dismissed only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim . . . .”8  In 2009, however, Iqbal advanced 
the decision in Twombly by requiring parties to go beyond the Conley 
interpretation of “fair notice” and provide enough facts to meet a plausibility 
analysis, based in part on judges’ personal experience and common sense.9  
While the Supreme Court stated that the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal were 
not meant to support a heightened pleading standard,10 “there is close to a 
consensus among academic observers that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading 
standard marks a sharp break with the past”11 by shifting its long-standing 
support of notice pleading to the new plausibility pleading standard.  Arthur 
Miller, reviewing changes in civil litigation, declared that Twombly and Iqbal 
“represent a procedural ‘sea change’ in plaintiffs’ ability to survive the 
pleading stage.  [The Supreme Court] turn[s] their back on over sixty years 
of federal pleading jurisprudence as well as any possible alternative 
procedural approaches that might be better suited to meeting the concerns 
expressed in the Court’s opinions.”12  
The authors of this Article agree with Judge Ellis’ statement that, “those 
who think that Iqbal and Twombly were mistakes would compound those 
mistakes to urge an immediate lurch back to Conley’s “no set of facts” rule 
                                                                                                                                      
generally Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) (providing a thorough analysis of the potential reasoning 
behind the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal); see also Cristina Calvar, Note, “Twiqbal”: A Political 
Tool, 37 J. LEGIS. 200 (2012).  While at the time of Conley, between 11% and 12% of federal civil 
cases went to trial, less than 2% of cases terminated at or after trial at the time of Iqbal.  See Burbank, 
supra note 3, at 16.  However, trials in the past were simpler and could be tried more expeditiously 
than trials in the Twombly/Iqbal era.  See Charles Clark, History, Systems and Functions of 
Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517 (1925).  For further discussion of empirical research, see Part III 
infra.   
6. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
7. Id. at 47. 
8. Id. at 45–46.  
9. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).   
10. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.  For more 
discussion, see Part II infra.  
11. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 122–23 (2011).  Reinert 
also provides a list of scholarly articles finding the change a “welcome” or “lamentable” one.  Id. 
at n.16.   
12. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 331 (2013). 
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without first measuring the impact of the new pleading standard.”13  It is 
important to address whether Twombly and Iqbal caused the shift from notice 
pleading practice to narrative pleading practice, pleading supported by 
sufficient facts to describe the context of the claims, or if narrative pleading 
practice predated those decisions.14  If narrative pleading was already 
commonplace before Twombly and Iqbal, those decisions likely had a more 
limited effect on pleading practice than some suggest.  
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part II identifies the issue by tracing 
the history of pleading standards from the creation of the Federal Rules to 
the Twombly and Iqbal Supreme Court decisions to Congressional attempts 
to overturn the decisions.  The lower courts did not strictly adhere to Conley 
before Twombly and Iqbal, and lower court decisions may have been 
representative of changes already taking place in the federal judiciary.  Part 
III briefly addresses prior empirical research regarding potential changes due 
to Twombly and Iqbal.  Part IV describes the role of the federal forms and 
presents the methodology of two studies.  This Article examines initial 
pleading practice in automobile accident cases originally filed in federal 
court with federal defendants (Study 1) or with diversity jurisdiction (Study 
2) to determine whether pleading practices pre-Twombly resembled notice 
pleading, or if such pleadings included additional facts not required by the 
standard.  Automobile accident cases present a unique opportunity to 
examine how current pleading practices compare to the intent of the drafters 
of the Federal Rules.  This intent is originally expressed in Form 11 (formerly 
Form 9), the illustrative complaint for a negligence action presented in the 
Appendix of Forms accompanying the Federal Rules.  Part V discusses the 
findings, as well as the psychology of pleading, and offers some explanations 
as to why notice pleading practice was the exception, not the rule, the year 
before Twombly.  Part VI concludes the Article.  
Overall, our research indicates that complaints before Twombly often 
departed from notice pleading.  The level of specificity of the factual 
allegations contained in the complaint far exceeded the liberal standard 
expressed in Conley and illustrated by Form 11.  Pleading additional facts, 
beyond the notice pleading requirements in the Forms, was the dominant 
practice in simple negligence cases before Twombly.  That is not to say that 
Twombly and Iqbal did not mark a change in the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                                      
13. Hon. T.S. Ellis, III & Nitin Shah, Iqbal, Twombly, and What Comes Next: A Suggested Empirical 
Approach, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 64, 72 (2010), 
http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/114/114%20Penn%20Statim%2064.pdf. 
14. A good description of “narrative pleading” for our purposes is found in Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 
614 F.3d 400, 407 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal require “that the plaintiff 
must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together. 
In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did they happen”).  
In our view, narrative pleading provides a narrative of facts that exceeds the requirements of a notice 
pleading standard.  
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jurisprudence regarding pleading standards.15  Instead, as Brian Fitzpatrick 
stated, “Despite the Supreme Court’s best efforts prior to Twombly, [] lower 
federal courts [were] using heightened pleading for some time.”16  Before 
Twombly, pleading practice already resembled narrative pleading and it 
should not be presumed that the fact-barren notice pleading of Form 11 
(formerly Form 9) and Conley were “alive and well in spirit, even if not in 
every jot and tittle.”17  If the Supreme Court killed notice pleading, as has 
been suggested, it was only pulling the plug on a pleading practice that had 
already lost its vitality. 
II.  PLEADING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Twombly and Iqbal unleashed a wide array of legal analyses and 
initiatives, most of which advocated for a return to the pleading practices and 
standards that existed the day before Twombly was decided.  But what exactly 
were pleading practices prior to Twombly?  Did attorneys rely on the liberal 
fair notice standard in framing a complaint?  Or had a more fact-specific 
pleading practice and a heightened pleading standard already materialized?  
Before answering these questions, two clarifications regarding 
terminology will be helpful.  First, there is a distinction between “pleading 
practice” and “pleading standards.”   Pleading practice is how the plaintiff’s 
attorney frames the complaint, including the extent to which the plaintiff’s 
attorney includes information on the factual circumstances to support their 
claims.  Pleading standards are the legal standards employed by the courts to 
determine if the complaint can survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.  Most scholarly articles review decisions by courts when resolving 
motions to dismiss, and study pleading standards.18  Pleading practices, in 
                                                                                                                                      
15. For a discussion of the burdens of pleading, see Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-
Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (on the burdens for claimants); Alexander A. Reinert, The 
Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767 (2014) (on the burdens for judges).  
16. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1631 
(2012). 
17. JONAH B. GELBACH, SELECTION IN MOTION: A FORMAL MODEL OF RULE 12(B)(6) AND THE 
TWOMBLY-IQBAL SHIFT IN PLEADING PRACTICE 4 (footnote omitted), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138428 (last visited June 18, 2013). 
18. When we presented an early version of this paper at a 2013 conference, the resulting discussion 
became a “highly contentious slugfest” that ensued partially regarding the benefits of studying 
pleading practice in addition to pleading standards.  (“The discussant argued that the FJC’s focus 
on the realities of lawyers’ practice was irrelevant to the Court’s power-grab in Twombly, and that 
pleading standards mattered infinitely more than pleading practice.” David Hoffman, CELS VIII: 
Data is Revealing, Part 1 (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/10/ 
cels-viii-data-is-revealing-part-1.html).  Some especially enjoyed the discussion. (“As it was 
wrapping up, an economically-trained empiricist in the room commented how fun he had found it 
and how he hoped to see more papers on the topic of Twombly in the future.”  Hoffman, id.  Much 
discussion focused on prior work by author Joe Cecil.  That program of research does not directly 
concern pleading practice and will not be discussed herein but, rather, in an in-progress manuscript 
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part, are responsive to pleading standards established by courts to assess the 
viability of complaints, but pleading practices may also be responsive to 
other factors as well.  This Article is a study of pleading practices.  It is 
important to note both the standard and practice actually used by attorneys.  
Even if the courts used a notice pleading standard, evidence that attorneys’ 
pleading practice was more fact-based and akin to narrative pleading shows 
a disconnect worthy of research. 
Second, this Article focuses on how the factual content of the complaint 
relates to Form 11 in the Appendix of Forms that accompanies the Federal 
Rules.  We will further address the Forms in Part III, but for initial 
clarification purposes, Form 11 is the current, restyled version of Form 9.  
Form 9 was the original model complaint for automobile negligence, 
developed by the drafters in 1938, to illustrate the minimal requirements of a 
negligence complaint that would withstand a motion to dismiss.19  In 
Twombly, the Supreme Court endorsed the concise complaint in Form 9 as 
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss,20 while at the same time 
announcing a more demanding plausibility requirement, leading to much 
confusion over the continued vitality of Form 9.21  Form 11 grew out of the 
restyling of the Federal Rules and forms in December 2009, which was 
intended “to translate present text into clear language that does not change 
the meaning.”22  However, the restyled Form 11 removed two explicit 
statements from Form 9 that presented examples of facts surrounding the 
circumstances of the accident (i.e., while “crossing said highway;” “plaintiff 
was thrown down and had his leg broken”).  Restyled Form 11 now offers an 
even leaner statement of the accident’s factual circumstances (i.e., “On 
<Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against 
the plaintiff.”).  While the restyled Form 11 is used as a reference point to 
assess complaints filed in 2006, in Part III the factual elements that appeared 




                                                                                                                                      
by that author.  For a draft version, see Joe S. Cecil, Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments 
on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal (last updated Mar. 19, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026103. 
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. APP. FORMS A AND B.  
20. Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 590 n. 9 (2007). 
21. For examples of efforts to reconcile the requirements of Twombly with the language of Form 9, see 
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Robert G. Bone, 
Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009).  
Edward Cooper points out that the Supreme Court had little choice, since FED. R. CIV. P. 84 says 
that the forms in the Appendix to the rules “suffice under these rules . . . .”  Edward H. Cooper, 
King Arthur Confronts TWIQY Pleading, 90 OR. L. REV. 955, 966 n.30 (2012).   
22. Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1761 (2004). 
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A.  From Code pleading to Conley 
As stated by Miller, “History matters.”23  When the Federal Rules were 
adopted in 1938, the immediate goal was to lessen the burdensome nature of 
Code pleadings.  The drafters wanted a more pragmatic method with more 
flexible rules and judicial discretion that would promote broad access to the 
courts for the common man.24  Judge Charles Clark sought to simplify 
pleading practices and ensure the pleadings gave fair notice of the general 
nature of the plaintiff’s claims to the defendant.25  Whereas Code pleading 
required that the pleadings set forth the essential facts and specialized 
allegations in the complaint, Rule 8 requires only “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”26 With this liberal 
approach, more parties would be allowed to pass through the “doors to 
discovery,”27 the same “doors” that future scholars would state were being 
locked by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.28 
The liberal pleading standard faced early challenges.  In 1955, the 
Advisory Committee rejected a proposal in response to Dioguardi v. 
Durning29 that would have required the complainant to plead facts supporting 
the cause of action.30  The Advisory Committee stated that the original rule 
“adequately sets forth the characteristics of good pleading; does away with 
the confusion resulting from the use of “facts” and “cause of action”; and 
requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as the basis of his claim 
for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is 
entitled to it.”31 
                                                                                                                                      
23. Miller, supra note 5, at 3.  For a further examination of the history of pleading from Thirteenth 
Century England to the time of the Federal Rules, see Hon. John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: 
The Latest Retreat From Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8–13 (2009); and SCOTT 
DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013).  
24. DODSON, supra note 23, at 17.  See also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1218 (3d ed. 2013) (for additional discussion of the history 
of pleading, including discussion of the Field Code).  
25. DODSON, supra note 23, at 18.  
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); see generally 
Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272 (1943) (defining and providing 
examples of Code pleading). 
27. Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal 
on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012). 
28. Id.; See also Andrew I. Gavil, Civil Rights and Civil Procedure: The Legacy of Conley v. Gibson, 
52 HOW. L.J. 1, 14 (2008) (stating that, in Twombly, “the Court reached for the ‘closed’ instead of 
the ‘open’ sign it had held out for Conley.”). 
29. 139 F.2d at 774.  
30. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18–19 (Oct. 1955), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV10-1955.pdf.  
31. Id. at 19.  
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 In 1957, the Supreme Court endorsed this approach in Conley v. 
Gibson,32 by stating that pleadings needed to meet the requirements of Rule 
8 and “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests” to survive a motion to dismiss.33  Conley became 
the benchmark case for fair notice, or notice pleading.  The Court in Conley 
announced that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim . . . .”34  Under Conley, judges rarely looked 
beyond the pleadings and, instead, accepted all factual (not conclusory) 
allegations as true, drawing inferences in favor of the pleader.  The Conley 
standard allowed more cases to survive motions to dismiss and put the burden 
on discovery and summary judgment to dispose of unmeritorious claims.35  
Code pleading was seemingly dead.  
B.  Whither Notice Pleading?  
In the next 50 years, the Supreme Court generally upheld Conley and 
the notice pleading standard, with a few notable departures.36  Still, some 
lower courts “effectively ignored the standard while insisting on heightened 
or . . . fact pleading” in some cases. 37  In 2003, Fairman found that targeted 
heightened pleading was “amazingly prevalent”38 and that “every circuit 
applied some form of heightened pleading to conspiracy claims.”39 
                                                                                                                                      
32. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) for an 
earlier discussion of the role of pleading.  In Conley, the plaintiffs (“Negro members of the 
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks”) brought a class action lawsuit against their union, 
alleging that it did not protect them against a loss of employment when they were fired and replaced 
with white employees or similar-race employees with less seniority.  Conley, 355 U.S. at 42. 
33. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48. 
34. Id. at 45–46.  
35. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).  
36. The uneven articulation of the notice pleading standard by the Supreme Court is discussed in 
DODSON, supra note 23, at 41-45 (identifying three Supreme Court cases as being in irreconcilable 
tension with the Conley notice pleading standard: Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Papasan 
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); and Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).  Miller, by 
contrast, characterizes the time between Conley and Twombly as “an impressive unbroken string of 
Supreme Court decisions repeating and reinforcing the norm of notice pleading.”  Miller, supra 
note 12, at 333 (noting a departure from the notice pleading standard by a number of federal courts). 
37. Miller, supra note 5, at 18–19 (citing Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003)); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986); Richard L. Marcus, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998). 
38. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1002-04.  In particular, Fairman found that, in civil rights cases, some 
jurisdictions required specific evidence of unlawful intent when subjective intent was a prima facie 
element.  Id.  
39. Fairman, supra note 38, at 1033. 
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Heightened pleading standards existed for many different case types, ranging 
from antitrust to RICO40 cases,41 and were “a long time in the making.”42  
Still, the Supreme Court endorsed notice pleading.  In Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, the Court 
stated, “We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading 
standard’ [imposed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit] . . . 
with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”43 
This was reaffirmed in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., when the Court found 
that a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination cases 
violated Rule 8(a)(2).44  Only five months before Twombly, the Court, in 
Jones v. Bock,45 reaffirmed that “adopting different and more onerous 
pleading rules” is a task of the rules committees, not of the courts on a case-
by-case basis.46 
 Though many districts pulled back on heightened pleading standards 
after Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, Fairman noted some districts continued 
the practice and heightened pleading, for one subjective intent element could 
“essentially eviscerate[ ] the entire claim.”47  In some instances, the lower 
courts appeared to directly oppose Supreme Court decisions striking down 
heightened pleading standards, even in civil rights cases resembling 
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz.  In Oliver v. Scott,48 the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals required plaintiffs to “allege specific conduct giving rise to a 
constitutional violation”49 where government officials were sued in their 
individual capacities.  Oliver, decided the same year as Swierkiewicz, directly 
contradicted the Leatherman decision.  Four years later, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, in Totten v. Norton, granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff “failed to allege facts 
sufficient to support one element of a prima facie case of retaliation,”50 a 
higher standard than under Conley.  
                                                                                                                                      
40. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 
(codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970)). 
41. Fairman, supra note 37; Fairman discusses the pleading practice in antitrust, Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), civil rights, conspiracy, 
copyright, defamation, negligence, and RICO cases.  
42. Reinert, supra note 11, at 131.  But see Reinert, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, supra note 15, at 1771–
72 n.28 (acknowledging that there were some “detours” from notice pleading by lower courts and 
citing Fairman’s finding that notice pleading has rarely been the practice, but stating “this claim 
should not be overstated”).  
43. 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).  
44. 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 
45. 549 U.S. 199 (2007).  
46. Id. at 224. 
47. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1004.  
48. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2002).  
49. Id. at 741.  
50. Totten v. Norton, 421 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2006).  
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Lower courts might have viewed the Supreme Court’s dicta statement 
in Leatherman that there was “no occasion to consider whether [the Court’s] 
qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading….”51 
as punting the issue of heighted pleading, rather than seeking a return to 
notice pleading.  Still, to some, cases defying notice pleading language 
“bordered on lawlessness.”52 
This was not the first time the Supreme Court showed hesitancy (albeit, 
in dicta) to remove heightened pleading.  In 1983, a footnote in the Court’s 
opinion in Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of 
Carpenters maintained support for a heightened standard, stating that “a 
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in 
pleading.”53  A few courts also read the footnote in Associated General 
Contractors as a mandate for heightened pleading in antitrust cases.54  
Similarly, in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Siegert v. Gilley, he wrote 
that “the heightened pleading standard is a necessary and appropriate 
accommodation”55 in qualified immunity analyses.  Other courts might have 
interpreted Conley as a goal to achieve justice, rather than a literal rule that 
all pleadings suffice if they meet Conley standards.  In fact, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that the “exceedingly 
forgiving attitude towards pleading deficiencies . . . in Conley . . . has never 
been taken literally.”56 
Fairman concluded that notice pleading was “a myth,”57 showing that 
pleading standards in the years before Twombly were “a far cry from notice 
pleading”58 and that the “rhetoric does not match the reality of federal 
pleading practice.”59  However, Fairman also noted that notice pleading 
remained the dominant practice in complaints alleging negligence.  This 
                                                                                                                                      
51. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166–67 
(1993). 
52. Burbank, supra note 3, at 6 (citing Perry v. Southeastern Boll Weevil Eradication Found., 154 
F.App’x. 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2005); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2008)).  
53. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983).  The Court, however, 
did note that “we are perhaps stretching the rule of Conley . . . too far.”  Id. 
54. See Fairman, supra note 37, at 1017 n.198 (providing three examples of cases where the courts 
perceived the footnote as a mandate and imposed what Fairman refers to as hyperpleading).  
55. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
56. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).  
57. Fairman, supra note 37, at 988.  The time before Twombly was considered a time of Conley notice 
pleading, but the research by Fairman shows that that was not the case across a wide number of 
case types.  Though Fairman’s assessment of the mythical nature of notice pleading might be a bit 
hyperbolic, when (if ever) notice pleading was the dominant pleading practice and standard 
warrants additional research.  
58. Id. at 989.  Fairman’s article remains the most thorough review of pleading requirements across a 
wide range of case types. 
59. Id. at 988.  Fairman notes that despite the federal courts commonly referencing notice pleading and 
the Conley standard, heightened pleading standards became common.  
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Article expands on Fairman’s work and shows that, even in negligence cases, 
notice pleading practice was no longer the norm before Twombly or Iqbal.60 
C.  Twombly, Iqbal, and After 
In Twombly, the plaintiffs, representing a class of local phone and high-
speed Internet subscribers, sued a group of carriers for antitrust violations 
under the Sherman Act and alleged the carriers conspired to discourage 
competition.61  The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York granted the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss,62 but the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that 
the plaintiffs stated a claim under the Conley standard.63  The Supreme Court 
reversed finding that the plaintiffs’ twenty-eight-page, ninety-six-paragraph 
complaint was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  The Court stated, 
“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”64  While the Court 
held that the allegations should be judged “in light of common economic 
experience,”65 the opinion did not provide clear guidance on what made 
something plausible or whose experience should be considered.  The Court 
announced that Conley had “earned its retirement.”66  Justice Stevens noted, 
in his dissent, that the opinion was “the first by any Member of this Court to 
express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.”67  Yet, the 
Court also stated that it did “not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading 
standard….”68  The Justices who joined the Twombly opinion stated that 
Twombly only “represented a relatively minor reorientation” and not a 
change that “could fundamentally alter the role of litigation in American 
society.”69  Many commentators immediately disagreed, arguing that the 
Twombly decision sent “shockwaves”70 through the lower courts. 
                                                                                                                                      
60. Id. at 1051.  Though even here Fairman found instances of courts requiring heightened pleading 
standards.  Id. 
61. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
62. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
63. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005).  
64. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  
65. Id. at 565.  
66. Id. at 563.  
67. Id. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
68. Id. at 569 n.14 (majority opinion).  
69. Stephen B. Burbank, PLEADING AND THE DILEMMAS OF MODERN AMERICAN PROCEDURE, 93 
JUDICATURE 109, 114 (2009).  See also Adam McDonell Moline, Comment, Nineteenth Century 
Principles for Twenty First Century Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 159 (2010); Martin H. Redish, 
Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 
ENGAGE, Nov. 2011, at 145. 
70. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851 (2008).  
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Two weeks after Twombly, the Court’s per curiam opinion in Erickson 
v. Pardus unexpectedly reaffirmed support for the Conley standard, at least 
in pro se cases.71  In weighing a prisoner’s civil rights complaint, the Court 
referenced Twombly, but only to cite the Conley fair notice standard.72  The 
Erickson opinion made no reference to the newly minted plausibility standard 
and did not clarify whether Twombly only applied to antitrust cases.  
One month after Twombly, the Court ruled on the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which created a heightened 
pleading standard for some securities claims and delayed discovery.73  The 
Court ruled that when pleading intent under the PSLRA, “an inference of 
scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent 
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent 
intent.”74  By interpreting this statutory standard as going beyond notice 
pleading and discussing levels of plausibility, the decision more closely 
resembled the plausibility standard in Twombly than the Conley standard. 
Still, the Court did not address how broadly lower courts should apply the 
Twombly plausibility standard in cases not covered by the PSLRA. 
The answer came two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.75  Javaid Iqbal, a 
Pakistani Muslim and pretrial detainee, alleged that United States 
government officials, including then Attorney General John Ashcroft, acted 
unconstitutionally by confining him and others in allegedly brutal 
conditions.76  The district court, citing Conley, denied most of the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss.77  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit heard the case just after the Supreme Court’s Twombly decision, and 
applied a plausibility standard, while also citing the Twombly footnote 
indicating that the Supreme Court did not intend to apply a heightened 
standard.78  The Second Circuit allowed most of the case to proceed, but the 
Court reversed in a 5–4 opinion.79  
The Court in Iqbal did not refer to notice pleading or to the fair notice 
Conley language the Court had recently recited in Erickson.80  Instead, the 
                                                                                                                                      
71. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
72. Id. at 93. 
73. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995).  
74. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).  
75. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
76. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2005). 
77. Id.  
78. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
79. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. 
80. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 553, 577 (2010) (also noting that the Court “omitted most of the . . . (12)(b)(6) boilerplate 
language”).  Hatamyar presents a thorough analysis of the 12(b)(6) language often cited by courts 
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Court expanded the Twombly plausibility standard to all civil cases.81  The 
Court created a two-pronged approach to review motions to dismiss.82  First, 
the judge must remove all conclusory allegations from consideration and 
focus solely on factual allegations.83  Then, the judge must consider the 
remaining alleged facts through a subjective lens.  The Court held that 
“determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . 
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 
judicial experience and common sense.”84  In doing so, the Court seemingly 
implied that, based on its judicial experience and common sense, the 
complaint failed to allege a plausible claim.  Thus, the Court seemed to state 
that if the Second Circuit had properly applied its own judicial experience 
and common sense, it too would have found the complaint lacking.  
Providing only notice of the claims against a defendant was no longer enough 
to survive a motion to dismiss.85 
As expected, a shift of this magnitude led to vigorous debate.86  A 
plausibility standard, combined with a judge’s subjective analysis of the 
complaint, could lead to inconsistent rulings, since a clear factual allegation 
to one judge might be a conclusion to another.87  Some commentators wrote 
that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions “destabilized the entire system of civil 
                                                                                                                                      
regarding factors such as how reasonable inferences are to be made to the benefit of the plaintiff.  
Id.  
81. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
82. Id. at 679–80. 
83. Id.    
84. Id. at 679.  
85. See Miller, supra note 5, at 19 (citing Tahir v. Import Acquisition Motors, LLC, No. 09 C 6471, 
2010 WL 2836714 at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2010)). 
86. See Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 959 (2010) (“[C]riticism of the Twombly decision was speedy and abundant.”).  
87. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? 
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009); see also 
Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections 
Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1257 (2008); Burbank, 
supra note 3, at 12; Miller, supra note 5.  For further examples of how distinguishing factual 
allegations from conclusions can be difficult, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).  For a 
recent partial dissent questioning the implementation of Twombly and Iqbal, see Horras v. American 
Capital Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2013) (“This is an important development, but we 
must be careful not to embellish it.”); see also Robinson v. Beard, No. 08-3156, 2009 WL 2215088, 
at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2009).  See also Part V for additional discussions of the psychology of 
judicial decision making.  
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litigation,”88 while others predicted that the effects were less likely to change 
pleading practice than some feared.89   
According to Miller, the subjective prong invited an “inappropriate” 
level of “virtually unbridled discretion”90 that transformed the purpose of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a “potentially draconian method of foreclosing 
access.”91  This made it “harder for plaintiffs to find representation, even for 
potentially meritorious claims.”92  The new standard seemed to suggest a 
possible return to the “endless, technical bickering about distinctions 
between ‘ultimate facts,’ ‘evidence,’ and ‘conclusions’”93 that led to the 
adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938.  Justice Ginsburg also expressed 
concern during the Second Circuit Judicial Conference in 2009 that she 
thought “the Court’s majority messed up the Federal Rules.”94  
A few years later, concerns still remain.  In 2014, three Supreme Court 
cases addressed plausibility pleading.  In May 2014, the Court cited Iqbal in 
its discussion of qualified immunity in Wood v. Moss,95 but did not clarify 
how a judge “should evaluate allegations of a defendant’s intent.”96  The 
following month, in response to allegations that the Internal Revenue Service 
had improper motives for issuing summonses, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Clarke stated, “The taxpayer need only make a showing of facts that 
give rise to a plausible inference of improper motive.”97   
                                                                                                                                      
88. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
821, 823 (2010); see also Miller, supra note 5, at nn.52, 53 for views of scholars in response to 
Twombly and Iqbal; see also Thomas P. Gressette, Jr., The Heightened Pleading Standard of Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase in American Legal History Begins, 
58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 455 (2010) (stating that the decisions represented “the beginning of a new 
phase in the history of federal pleading requirements”). 
89. For earlier articles discussing how the predicted effects of Twombly are less likely to change 
pleading practice and doctrinal precedent as some fear, see Richard A. Epstein, Twombly After Two 
Years: The Procedural Revolution in Antitrust that Wasn’t, GCP: ONLINE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL 
COMPETITION POLICY 1 (July 30, 2009); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the 
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA. L. REV. 873; see also Dobyns v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 
412, 428 (2010) (finding that Twombly and Iqbal do not significantly alter how courts “should apply 
other long-standing pleading requirements”). 
90. See Miller, supra note 5, at 83. 
91. Id. at 22.  
92. Id. at 67.  
93. Hatamyar, supra note 80, at 557.   
94. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available 
at www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_06-12-09.html.  
95. 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014).  
96. Adam Steinman, SCOTUS Decision in Wood v. Moss: Guidance on Pleading Standards?, CIV. 
PROCEDURE & FED. COURTS BLOG (May 27, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/ 
2014/05/scotus-decision-in-wood-v-moss-guidance-on-pleading-standards.html (finding that “At 
first glance, Wood does not seem to provide a conclusive resolution” and then stating that “the 
presence of an objectively reasonable security rationale doomed the plaintiffs’ claims even if 
viewpoint discrimination also played a role.”). 
97. United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361 (2014); see also Patricia W. Moore, SCOTUS: IRS 
Summons Challenger Must Show Facts Giving Rise to Plausible Inference of Improper IRS Motive, 
CIV. PROCEDURE & FED. COURTS BLOG (June 20, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
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Then, in November 2014, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. City of 
Shelby, reminded that a plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her 
claim has substantive plausibility”98 but also stressed that the petitioners, on 
remand, should be allowed to amend their complaint.  This emphasis, and the 
Court’s desire to “ward off further insistence on a punctiliously stated ‘theory 
of the pleadings,’”99 led early commentators to note “an appearance of 
possible sheepishness about Twombly”100 and a “more sensible approach to 
pleading generally.”101 
Over the next few years, one hopes the Court will clarify the plausibility 
pleading standard and better explain how a judge should invoke judicial 
experience and common sense when making those determinations.102 
This Article does not seek to defend the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. 
Although we find that narrative pleading practice emerged before Twombly 
and Iqbal (at least in two federal case types), the decisions raise some 
concerns.  First, the decisions provide a complicated standard for resolving 
motions to dismiss that invites cognitive biases and disagreement over proper 
interpretation of the parties’ obligations and the extent to which judges 
should anticipate the success of discovery at an early stage of litigation.103  
Second, the decisions circumvented the long-established procedure 
established by the judicial branch to allow public comments and broad 
participation in the development of federal rules.104  Third, emerging 
                                                                                                                                      
civpro/2014/06/scotus-irs-summons-challenger-must-show-facts-giving-rise-to-plausible-
inference-of-improper-irs-motive.html.  
98. Johnson v. City of Shelby, No. 13-1318 at 2-3 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2014) (per curiam).  
99. Id. at 3.  
100. Barry Barnett, Twombly’s Remorse?, BLAWGLETTER (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://blawgletter.typepad.com/bbarnett/2014/11/twomblys-remorse.html.  
101. Adam Steinman, Some Thoughts on Johnson v. City of Shelby: Does It Help Make Sense of 
Twombly & Iqbal?, CIV. PROCEDURE & FED. COURTS BLOG (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/11/some-thoughts-on-johnson-v-city-of-shelby-
does-it-help-make-sense-of-twombly-iqbal.html.   
102.  While this Article refers only to federal court practice, it is of note that state courts have also adopted 
the plausibility pleading standard.  In July 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the standard 
in Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers LLC, 2014 WI 86, 849 N.W.2d 693.  See Patricia W. 
Moore, Wisconsin Adopts Twombly’s Plausibility Standard, CIV. PROCEDURE & FED. COURTS 
BLOG (July 25, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/07/wisconsin-adopts-
twomblys-plausibility-standard.html. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the standard 
shortly thereafter in Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014).  See Patricia W. 
Moore, Minnesota Supreme Court Rejects Twiqbal (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/08/minnesota-supreme-court-rejects-twiqbal-.html. 
103. For further discussion of decision making concerns and cognitive bias, see Part V. C. infra.  
104. The Federal Rules are amended under a delegation of authority under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).  See Steven B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of 
Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189 (2010), and Brooke D. Coleman, Deserving 
of Attention: The Proposed Abrogation of Civil Rule 84 & the Official Forms, PATENTLYO BLOG 
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/deserving-attention-abrogation.html.  For a 
discussion of rulemaking by the committee process, see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the 
Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 537 (2009); Robert G. Bone, Plausibility 
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empirical research on disadvantaged groups finds that Twombly and Iqbal 
negatively affected disadvantaged plaintiffs in certain types of cases.105 
Continued investigation into this important line of research is necessary. 
Fourth, the Twombly and Iqbal decisions do not recognize the ability and skill 
with which district court judges manage difficult issues concerning motion 
practice and the cost of discovery.106  Finally, the decisions sparked an 
increase in motions to dismiss by defendants and motions to amend, thereby 
increasing the costs to the parties and requiring judges to spend more time 
resolving additional motions.107 
In response to Twombly and Iqbal, some attempted to override the 
decisions and restore the notice pleading standard.108  The Notice Pleading 
Restoration Act of 2009 sought to “provide that Federal courts shall not 
dismiss complaints under rule 12(b)(6) . . . except under the standards set 
forth” in Conley.109  The bill did not leave the Senate Judiciary Committee.110  
The United States House of Representatives proposed its own bill, the Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009, to restore notice pleading under Conley.111  
                                                                                                                                      
Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 849, 
883-85 (2010); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1133–36 (2002); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal 
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 908 (1976). 
105. For example, see Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011; Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond 
Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study on Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 
17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New 
Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 
(2012).  For a further examination of Brescia’s work, see Part III infra.  
106. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy 
of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process 
through ‘careful case management’, . . . given the common lament that the success of judicial 
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”) (internal citations omitted). 
107. However, research by one of us finds that they have little if any effect in the outcome of litigation. 
See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES, (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/ 
$file/motioniqbal.pdf; JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 
12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, at vii (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/ motioniqbal2.pdf. 
108. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 88, at 856–59.  
109. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1504/text.  
110. Id. 
111. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4115.  This Act would prohibit a federal court “from 
dismissing a complaint: (1) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief; or (2) on the basis of a 
determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint do not show the plaintiff’s 
claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable interference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. 
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Again, despite hearings on the matter, the bill quickly died.112  These attempts 
generally ignored that many lower courts already started to chip away at the 
Conley standard before Twombly, and rarely acknowledged whether the 
current pleading practice could still be defined as notice pleading. 
Even if the acts are reintroduced into Congress, they are unlikely to 
garner much interest, as “the reinstatement of Conley will not . . . appease 
political concern”113 and “is quite unlikely and probably undesirable.”114 
Still, a concern with these congressional acts and their progeny is the notion 
that restoring the world to the day before Twombly restores pleading to a 
uniform notice pleading standard and practice.  Forcing courts to return to 
the Conley standard requires courts to ignore a wide swath of decisions where 
some courts acknowledged heightened pleading standards for some cases,115 
and ignores that attorneys’ pleading practices were already more akin to 
narrative pleading than notice pleading before Twombly.  
III.  BRIEF REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES 
The past few years have brought about many reviews and empirical 
studies assessing whether judicial decisions on motions to dismiss changed 
after Twombly and Iqbal.  All appear to assume that litigants and courts, prior 
to Twombly, were following the notice pleading standard.  As Judge Ellis 
aptly stated, “the debate over the merits and demerits of Iqbal and Twombly 
has been characterized by almost as much heat as light.”116 
Traditional legal scholarship examining pleading standards relies on 
published court decisions to draw inferences about changes in pleading 
standards over time.  Recently, more rigorous empirical studies of district 
court decisions have used systematic coding and statistical analyses to 
understand the effect of changes in pleading standards across more 
representative sets of cases.  Both of these approaches assume that attorney 
pleading practices match the standards articulated by the courts in opinions 
                                                                                                                                      
112. For more information on the Acts and the written statements for the record and testimony regarding 
them, see Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg56719/pdf/CHRG-111shrg56719.pdf; Burbank, supra note 3. 
113. Calvar, supra note 5, at 220.  
114. Miller, supra note 5, at 99.  This Article does not take a position regarding future legislation or 
amendments to the Federal Rules.  For a review of possible amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure that would take into account the standards of Twombly and Iqbal, see generally 
Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TWIQY Pleading, 90 OR. L. REV. 955 (2012). 
115. See Fairman, supra note 37; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal 
Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1622 (2012) (stating that “as a practical matter, lower 
federal courts long ago elevated pleading standards in the face of the exponential increases in 
discovery costs faced by corporate defendants”). 
116. And we certainly accept a share of the responsibility. See Ellis & Shah, supra note 13, at 64. 
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resolving motions to dismiss.  This Article employs a third approach by 
directly examining individual complaints to determine the manner in which 
attorneys presented and supported the causes of action, and how these 
pleading practices relate to the pleading standards articulated by the courts. 
This is not a study of how the standards have or have not changed the 
resolution of dispositive motions and does not seek to support or critique 
prior studies.  Still, we will briefly review past studies when they provide 
context for this pleading practice research and provide a pattern of findings 
that may be explained, at least in part, by the results of this study.117 
In a review of twelve studies regarding the effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal, Engstrom concluded that the studies demonstrated that Twombly and 
Iqbal provided “at most a single-digit impact on the observed rate at which 
judges have granted 12(b)(6) motions (i.e., the judicial behavior effect), and 
this is true of orders with and without plaintiff-excluding effect.”118  Of 
course, very little change would be expected if narrative pleading practice 
had already become prevalent before the Twombly or Iqbal decisions.  
                                                                                                                                      
117. Initial empirical analyses of the judicial response to the Supreme Court decisions focused solely on 
the pre-Iqbal period and examined potential differences between motion to dismiss grant rates in 
the Conley era and the period between Twombly and Iqbal.  Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado 
About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); Seiner, supra note 105; Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading 
Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010); William H.J. Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal 
Change with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working 
Paper No. 575, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883831.  For example, in one of the 
first empirical studies, Hannon examined cases brought before and soon after the Twombly decision, 
and found that “the new linguistic veneer that the Court has placed on Rule 8(a) and 12(b)(6) 
appears to have had almost no substantive impact” with the exception of civil rights cases.  Hannon, 
supra, at 1815 (finding that motions to dismiss in civil rights cases were more likely to be granted 
following Twombly).  Hannon did not distinguish between motions to dismiss granted with leave to 
amend the complaint and motions to dismiss granted without leave to amend.  Hubbard examined 
the outcome of motions in cases filed before the Twombly decision and resolved after that decision 
(thereby controlling for changes by plaintiffs in the selection of cases filed) and found no effect of 
Twombly on the outcome of those cases.  Hubbard, supra.  However, research on the outcome of 
motions to dismiss resolved in the interim period between the Supreme Court decisions on Twombly 
and Iqbal might provide only limited guidance.  As Hannon readily states of that time period: “faced 
with interpreting Twombly, many judges have found uncertainty and confusion.”  Hannon, supra, 
at 1814 (footnote omitted).  In this ambiguous period, the appellate courts had not yet interpreted 
the Twombly decision.  That is not to say that Iqbal brought clarity, but that assessments of motion 
to dismiss rates in this period should be interpreted cautiously. 
118. David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 6, 29–30 app.A (2013).  The “plaintiff-excluding effect” is based on Jonah Gelbach’s model 
that attempts to take into account decisions by plaintiffs to not file cases that would have been filed 
before Iqbal, or to settle cases for a lesser value after Iqbal.  Engstrom’s meta-analysis demonstrates 
that the more rigorous studies estimate either no effect or a very modest effect while studies lacking 
in rigor tend to have greater estimates of effect.  Id.  Engstrom is critical of some studies because, 
as a group, they tend not to focus on the party, fail to take into account the dynamic nature of 
litigation that may result in changes in litigation practice, and fail to assess the costs and benefits of 
judges’ implementation of these standards on the overall fairness of the litigation process.  Id at 18–
30.  See also Gelbach, supra note 27.  
40 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
Two recent studies include findings that relate to the vitality of notice 
pleading before Twombly.  Both of these studies attempted to distinguish 
between motions to dismiss that were granted due to insufficient facts, and 
those that were granted due to legal insufficiencies.  While both studies claim 
to find an increase in motions granted due to insufficient facts after Iqbal, the 
real surprise is how common dismissals for factual insufficiency were before 
Twombly.  
In 2012, Raymond Brescia conducted a focused study of employment 
and housing discrimination cases, which have often been the object of 
motions to dismiss.119  Unlike previous studies, Brescia restricted his 
examination to only those orders that assessed the factual specificity of the 
pleadings.  The orders were filed during a continuous period starting before 
Twombly in 2004 and ending after Iqbal in 2010.120  Of interest, Brescia 
found that even before Twombly, 61% of the motions were granted at least in 
part due to an insufficient presentation of facts in the complaint.121 Brescia 
also found that courts did not follow the two-part test in Iqbal.122  Brescia 
noted that Twombly and Iqbal were often mentioned only in boilerplate 
language, and then disregarded.123  Judges, in more than half of the cases 
where motions to dismiss were granted in full, ruled without applying any 
plausibility standard.124  Of the ninety-five analyzed cases, district courts 
only applied the plausibility test in four cases125 and made a tangential 
reference to the judges’ own experience and common sense, as recommended 
by the Supreme Court, in only one case.126  While Twombly and Iqbal “seem 
to represent a departure from a notice-pleading regime,”127 Brescia found that 
the proposed plausibility standard had less of an impact than expected.128  
Many courts “simply applied a relatively straightforward and traditional Rule 
8(a) analysis” more akin to notice pleading.129  
                                                                                                                                      
119. See generally Brescia, supra note 105.  However, this study faces its limitations.  For example, 
employment and housing discrimination cases could also be affected by the economic downturn, 
just as financial instruments cases likely were.  The subject matter of these cases in the post-Iqbal 
era could be more closely tied to firings and foreclosures due to the recession, and, if the subject 
matter of the complaint changes, it could add additional confounds when trying to examine how 
motion practice changed over time.   
120. Id. at 261. 
121. Id.  Brescia also found that the rate of dismissals based on factual insufficiency increased to 72% 
following Iqbal. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 278.   
124. Id. at 278–80.  Some have mentioned the frequency with which these cases have been cited as an 
indication of the extent to which they have changed pleading practice.  But such citation counts are 
likely a poor indicator of the extent of the influence of these opinions. 
125. Id. at 279. 
126. Id. at 284. 
127. Id. at 287.  
128. Id. at 278–79.  
129. Id. at 279. 
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In 2013, Scott Dodson examined approximately 2400 opinions 
resolving motions to dismiss, including about 1200 opinions decided the year 
before Twombly.130  Dodson found that, even before Twombly, 25.3% of the 
dismissed claims were dismissed on the basis of insufficient facts.131  Dodson 
concluded, “Clearly Rick Marcus and Chris Fairman were right:  Even before 
Twombly, lower courts were holding a significant number of claims to a 
pleading standard not recognized (and arguably disavowed by the Supreme 
Court).”132 
This confirmed earlier findings that, despite Rule 8’s statement that 
complaints should be both “short and plain,”133 some complaints exceeded 
4000 pages and included “voluminous details.”134  With notice pleading, 
there should be no need for such a verbose complaint, as fair notice alone 
should allow the case to continue and survive a motion to dismiss.  
Additionally, orders resolving motions on the basis of insufficient facts 
should not occur at this rate. Combined with the empirical analysis that, 
especially in employment and housing discrimination cases, departure from 
the strict form of notice pleading as intended by the drafters was common 
prior to Twombly, there is ample evidence to question if notice pleading was 
the uniform standard in the time just prior to Twombly.  
While little research has examined pleading practice, in 2012, Emery 
Lee surveyed about 1500 plaintiff and defendant attorneys regarding the 
early stages of litigation and asked attorneys whether their pleading practices 
changed since Twombly and Iqbal and, if so, how the pleading practices had 
changed.135  Only half of the attorneys reported their pleading practices 
changed, with almost all, 92%, reporting they included more facts in 
complaints.136  We do not doubt that attorneys now include more facts when 
faced with the plausibility standard.137  Instead, the present research 
establishes that attorney practice had already exceeded the requirements of 
the notice pleading standard before Twombly was decided and, thus, 
                                                                                                                                      
130. DODSON, supra note 23, at 98 tbl3.3.    
131. Id.  Dodson also found that the rate of dismissals based on factual insufficiency increased to 47.9% 
following Iqbal.  Dismissals based on insufficient legal allegations dropped following Iqbal, from 
50.2% to 43.2%.  Id. at 98 tbl.3.4. 
132. Id. 
133.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Id. 8(e). 
134. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1009–11 (citing Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979)).  
135. EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EARLY STAGES OF LITIGATION ATTORNEY SURVEY, 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 8 (Mar. 2012). 
This study was in response to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s “continued interest in the 
impact of Twombly and Iqbal.” 
136. Id. at 8, 16. In addition, 28% of attorneys reported more factual investigation prior to filing a 
complaint.  Id.  However, it is of note that these findings are due to self-reporting by the attorneys, 
not an investigation of the complaints themselves.  We do not dispute that Twombly and Iqbal likely 
increased the use of facts in complaints, and preliminary research has found that narrative pleading 
practice has become more detailed after Iqbal.  See Section V infra.  
137. In fact, we have done preliminary research that confirms this belief.  See infra note 253.  
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Twombly and Iqbal were not the cause of this shift from notice pleading to 
narrative pleading practice. 
IV. FEDERAL FORMS AND STUDY METHODOLOGY   
Judge Clark, a principal drafter of the Federal Rules, wrote in 1925 that 
pleading is a flexible standard and that “no system of pleading yet devised 
may be considered final, and . . . unless pleading rules are subject to constant 
examination and revaluation, they petrify, and become hindrances, not aids, 
to the administration of justice.”138  As shown in Part II, some courts had 
already replaced the notice pleading standard with more detailed pleading 
standards in some cases, though not for negligence cases.139  
We examined complaints in federal automobile accident negligence 
cases (common, both in their number and their geographic diversity) filed 
before the Twombly decision and found that even here, a more fact-intensive 
pleading practice dominated.  The facts required to plead a federal 
automobile accident case are fairly simple and are represented by the 
illustrative Form 11, Complaint for Negligence (formerly Form 9) in the 
Appendix of Forms accompanying the Federal Rules, thereby offering a 
distinctive opportunity to compare current pleading practice to the notice 
pleading practice intended by the drafters.140 
A.  Forms: Past, Present, and Future 
When formulating the Federal Rules, the Advisory Committee attached 
forms “showing how very little was required of plaintiffs”141 and these forms 
have remained a vestige of the drafters’ original intentions.  Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 84 states the Forms are “sufficient under the rules” for the 
purpose of promoting simplicity.142  Responding to early concerns that the 
form “would be insufficient in any court of law,” it was stated that “very few 
courts would hold such a general statement wholly invalid; that is, would 
                                                                                                                                      
138. Clark, supra note 27, at 545.  
139. See Fairman, supra note 37; Marcus, supra note 37.  
140. See FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/RulesAndForms/IllustrativeCivilRulesForms.aspx.  At the time of the adoption 
of the Federal Rules, this was designated as Form 9.  See also Fairman, supra note 37, at 1000 
(describing simplified notice pleading as referring “to short and plain statements of a claim that 
embody the simplicity of both Rule 8 and the Federal Forms”).  As stated supra in Part II, in 
December 2009, the Federal Rules and related forms were restyled and Form 9 became Form 11.  
Note that the restyled Form 11 is even more austere than the original Form 9, using place markers 
for the date and place of the accident, and not mentioning the nature of the injury. 
141. Burbank, supra note 3, at 5; see also Coleman, supra note 104.   
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 84. 
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hold that it did not state a cause of action.”143  Judge Clark stated “that this 
affords adequate basis for res judicata is clear”144 and that the Forms were 
“the most important part of the rules.”145  Notice pleading, the Federal Rules, 
and the Forms eventually combined to generally form one consistent 
pleading practice.146  Form 11 illustrates the intended principles of the 
Federal Rules.  
After a statement of jurisdiction, Form 11 (the restyled version of the 
Form 9 negligence complaint form discussed in Twombly)147 requires 
plaintiffs to complete the following: 
2. On <Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff. 
3. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, 
suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of 
$<_____>.  
Therefore, the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for 
$<_____> , plus costs.148 
In Twombly, the Supreme Court showed some support for Form 9.149 
However, lower courts were uncertain about the continued vitality of the 
Forms.  In Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified School District, the 
district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend 
and noted that the Forms “have been cast into doubt by Iqbal.” 150 
In response to “uncertainties about the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
still recent decisions on pleading standards,”151 a subcommittee of the 
                                                                                                                                      
143. Burbank, supra note 3, at 10 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT CLEVELAND, OHIO 222, 223 (1938)).  
144. DODSON, supra note 23, at 21 (citing Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460-61 
(1943).  See also, Fairman, supra note 37, at 1048 (“When Charles Clark envisioned the prototype 
of notice pleading, he selected a negligence claim—an automobile accident. Federal Form 9 
embodies the simplicity of notice pleading such a claim. The four-sentence ‘Complaint for 
Negligence’ includes only the date and location, the allegation that ‘defendant negligently drove a 
motor vehicle against plaintiff,’ and a general description of damages.  Even a complaint this brief 
satisfies the Rule 8 standard.”) (footnote omitted).   
145. DODSON, supra note 23, at 20 (citing Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. 
L. REV. 177, 191 (1958)).  
146. The Federal Rules, however, did address a few exceptions to the rule.  Notably, Federal Rule 9(b) 
addresses additional facts needed when alleging fraud.  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11. 
148. Id. 
149. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576 n.10 (2007) (providing the template for a negligent 
complaint as “On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, 
Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing 
said highway.”). 
150. No. CIV. 09–245 WBS CMK, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009); see also Iodice 
v. United States, 289 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2002).  
151. Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
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Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Judicial Conference Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure examined the role of the Forms and, in 
its May 2013 report, stated that “the best approach is to abrogate Rule 84 and 
the Rule 84 forms.”152  The subcommittee found that the Forms “have come 
to seem inadequate.”153  The proposal to abrogate Rule 84 came alongside a 
package of proposed amendments in response to concerns of excessive cost 
and inefficiencies in federal civil litigation, expressed at a national 
conference at Duke Law School (the Duke Conference).154  
The proposed amendments were submitted for public comment in 
August 2013155 and generated more than 2300 public comments, which were 
generally directed to the proposed amendments growing out of the Duke 
Conference.156  At least thirty comments directly addressed the proposed 
amendment to abrogate Rule 84 and the related forms, with almost twenty 
comments from members of the legal academy expressing their opposition.  
The Advisory Committee attributed this opposition “to continuing unease 
                                                                                                                                      
60 (May 8, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Reports/CV05-2013.pdf. 
152. Id. at  61 ll. 2352–53.   
153. Id. at l. 2368.  These recommendations were approved by the Judicial Conference Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure at its May 2014 meeting and forwarded to the Judicial Conference 
for consideration.  Concerns about the Forms do not focus solely on the negligence form.  The 
suitability of Form 18 for patent infringement complaints is of concern.  Some courts have 
expressed concern that Form 18 does not suffice and that using the form for patent infringement 
complaints is inadequate to survive a motion to dismiss.  See Macronix Int’l Co. v. Spansion, Inc., 
4 F. Supp. 3d 797 (E.D. Va. 2014).  This comes after a series of decisions that a complaint that 
conforms to Form 18 is adequate to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim despite 
the heightened standards for pleading announced by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.  See 
K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013); McZeal v. 
Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Microsoft Corp. v. Phoenix 
Solutions, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[A] declaratory judgment claim of no 
direct infringement need only plead facts to put the patentee on notice and need not be subject to 
the heightened pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal.”). 
154. See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/archives/projects-rules-committees/2010-civil-
litigation-conference.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).  This controversial package of amendments 
sought to improve the dispositions of civil actions “by advancing cooperation among the parties, 
proportionality in the use of available procedures, and early and active judicial case management.”  
Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Hon Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(June 14, 2014).  After considering the comments, the Advisory Committee recommended the 
withdrawal of proposed amendments that would have lowered the presumptive numbers of 
depositions and interrogatories, limited the presumptive number of requests to admit, and reduced 
the presumptive length of depositions.  Id.  
155. Memorandum from Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure to 
The Bench, Bar, and Public (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf. 
156. The number of comments understates the extent of the legal academy’s opposition to the abrogation 
of Rule 84.   
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over the direction of contemporary federal pleading standards.”157  Two 
submitted comments opposed to the amendments were subscribed to by 
numerous legal academics.  A comment from Professor Siegel, which was 
endorsed by 110 other law professors, objected to abrogation of the Forms, 
contending that the Forms are needed not to guide litigants but, instead, to 
constrain the actions of judges who are otherwise acting in violation of the 
law.158  A second comment from Professors Hershkoff, Steinman, Hoffman, 
Schneider, Reinert, and Shapiro endorsed by 171 other law professors, 
objected to the abrogation of the Forms as an indirect refutation of notice 
pleading and adoption of the plausibility pleading standard of Twombly and 
Iqbal. 159  The comment also objected to the lack of empirical evidence to 
                                                                                                                                      
157. Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. 
Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 412 (May 2, 2014), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ 
ST2014-05.pdf.  See, e.g., Comment from Arthur Miller 22 (Jan. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp_arthur_miller_1.9.14.pdf (Abrogation of the 
Forms “will be construed as the rulemakers’ acceptance—or implicit codification—of plausibility 
pleading under Twombly and Iqbal when in reality there has not been any fundamental re-
examination of the possible deleterious effects of those cases’ return to fact pleading, or any 
comprehensive or penetrating empiric research on the subject, or an exploration of other possible 
Rule amendments to meet the concerns defense interests have voiced over the years but which have 
not been established.  There really is no reason to take this action at this time; it is premature.”).  
One legal scholar also suggested that eliminating the Forms by abrogation of Rule 84 was a violation 
of the Rules Enabling Act.  See Comment from Brooke Coleman 1 (Feb. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp_seattle_university_school_of_law._brooke_c
oleman_2.7.14.pdf (“I believe that the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the Official Forms is a 
violation of the Rules Enabling Act process.  In short, the rules and the forms are one and the same. 
In order to understand the rule, one must look to the forms.  This means that in order to change a 
form, the rule and the form to which it corresponds must be changed together.  This is because a 
change to the form necessarily changes the rule to which it corresponds, meaning that both the form 
and rule must be considered and published under the Act.  The proposed change to Rule 84 and the 
forms is being done without reference to any of the rules to which the forms correspond.  This, I 
argue, is a violation of the Enabling Act process.”).  The Advisory Committee disagreed, noting, 
“The Committee believes that the publication actually made, with the full opportunity to comment, 
satisfies the Enabling Act.  The opportunity to comment has been seized, as evidenced by the 
comments received on the Rule 84 proposal.”  Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, supra, 
at 112. 
158. Comment from Jonathan Siegel on behalf of 110 Legal Academics 3 (Jan. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.asl.edu/Documents/News%20and%20Events/2014/Public_Comment_[2014-01-1].pdf 
(“The Report asserts that ‘[a] further reason to abrogate Rule 84 is the tension between the pleading 
forms and emerging pleading standards.’  If the ‘emerging pleading standards’ referred to are the 
ones emerging from judicial decisions such as Twombly, Iqbal, and their progeny, then this is a 
polite way of saying that the courts are violating the Federal Rules.  If a court dismisses a complaint 
that Rule 84 declares to be sufficient, the court is necessarily violating the Rules . . . . The Forms 
exist to indicate to judges how simple and brief pleadings can be and to make sure that judges do 
not wrongly dismiss complaints for being too simple and brief.”). 
159. Comment from Helen Hershkoff, New York University School of Law; Adam N. Steinman, Seton 
Hall University School of Law; Lonny Hoffman, University of Houston Law Center; Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, Brooklyn Law School; Alexander A. Reinert, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; and 
David L. Shapiro, Harvard Law School 16 (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Professors-Joint-Comment.pdf (“Given that the Committee has yet to take 
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support the Advisory Committee’s assertion that attorneys do not use the 
Forms.160  
In May 2014, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure approved a package of proposed amendments to the Civil 
Rules, including a proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the Appendix of 
Forms.161  The committee stated that, “most of the comments submitted were 
supportive of the proposal” and that, despite concerns, the Committee 
“unanimously determined that the publication process and the opportunity to 
comment on the proposal fully satisfies the Rules Enabling Act.”162  At the 
time of writing, the proposed amendments and proposed abrogation are under 
consideration by the Supreme Court.163 
While the research in this Article was not performed in response to the 
proposed abrogation of Rule 84, it does provide evidence that attorneys were 
going far beyond what the Forms required even before Twombly and Iqbal 
were decided.  As will be shown in the next section, pleading additional facts 
beyond the requirements of a notice pleading standard predated the Twombly 
or Iqbal decisions. 
B.  Narrative Pleading Study 1: Methodology and Results 
Auto accident negligence cases provide the clearest application of the 
drafters’ intent concerning the elements of a complaint required to meet the 
original notice pleading standard, as expressed by the federal forms.  Such 
cases naming a federal defendant typically involve an accident with a 
federally-owned vehicle performing official duties, such as a postal vehicle. 
Examination of this narrow case type allows us to compare pleading practices 
in cases that are likely to be very similar in terms of factual content or 
changing legal standards.  The requirements of the complaint initially filed 
in federal court should not vary from federal district to district.  In addition, 
                                                                                                                                      
a definitive position on plausibility pleading, striking the Form Complaints commits the Committee 
to a position that implicitly adopts plausibility pleading as the standard going forward. Abandoning 
the forms will effectively shut the door on reform of the pleading rules.”). 
160. Id. (“The Committee’s first explanation for why it is abandoning the Forms is based on casual 
empiricism and self-evident bias. As we understand it, a Subcommittee to study the Forms 
apparently started with the intuition that lawyers tend not to rely on the Forms, and then conducted 
an informal survey of undisclosed lawyers— unsurprisingly concluding that their initial intuitions 
were correct.”).  The research presented in this Article was prepared independently by researchers 
at the Federal Judicial Center and not completed at the request of the Advisory Committee.  
161. Report from the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Chief Justice of the U.S. and 
Members of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 16 (Sept. 2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf (stating that 
“after carefully studying the issue, the advisory committee determined that abrogation was the best 
course.”).  
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 1.  Status of the proposed amendments and abrogation was last checked on October 2, 2014.  
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we selected these cases to examine the finding by Fairman that simplified 
notice pleading dominated in the negligence area164 and in response to a 
comment by Miller about the role that Twombly and Iqbal might play in the 
federal judiciary: “It remains to be seen, however, whether district courts will 
extend the demands of plausibility pleading to require factual allegations of 
the elements of relatively uncomplicated civil actions, as exemplified by 
Official Form 11—formerly Form 9—the paradigm negligence 
complaint.”165 
 We examined a random sample of 200 federal automobile accident tort 
case complaints originally filed in federal court in 2006 (pre-Twombly) in 
which the United States was the named defendant.166  The cases came from 
59 different federal districts. We excluded cases that were filed by pro se 
parties to ensure that such complaints were filed by attorneys who should be 
aware of the federal notice pleading standard, and cases dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction to ensure that the complaints all met acceptable standards for 
establishing federal jurisdiction.167  We downloaded the initial complaints 
                                                                                                                                      
164. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1047 (“Negligence is the archetypal notice pleading claim.  Its elements 
are basic and well known: duty, breach, causation, and damages.  Putting a party on notice of a 
negligence claim should be just as easy.  It is therefore surprising to think that non-notice based 
pleading requirements might pop up in this area.  Nonetheless, they do.”).  In the end, Fairman 
concludes that, “Pleading practice in the negligence area thus reflects the pleading model. 
Simplified notice pleading still dominates.”  Id. at 1051.  In fact, Fairman may have underestimated 
the extent of non-notice pleading.  Fairman examined the pleading practices indirectly by reviewing 
federal appellate case law and some district court orders resolving motions to dismiss the 
complaints.  Negligence complaints with extensive factual pleading were unlikely to be challenged 
for an absence of factual support in judicial opinions resolving a motion to dismiss.  This study 
examines pleading practice by directly examining the content of the underlying complaints. 
165. Miller, supra note 12, at 40.  
166. Using the Integrated Database file of federal civil cases filed in calendar year 2006, we selected 
cases based on the following criteria: NOS=350 & ORIGIN=1 & FYR=2006 & PROSE=0 & 
JURIS=2 & DISP ne 3 (i.e., automobile tort cases (excluding product liability cases, as indicated 
by the filing attorney on the civil filing cover sheet), originally filed in federal district court in 2006 
by a represented plaintiff, naming the United States as a defendant, and not dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction). 
167. Seven of the 200 cases were excluded from the analysis because the complaint was not available 
for downloading through PACER, often because the record was sealed.  Five of the cases were 
excluded because they involved circumstances other than the collision of two vehicles, such as 
injuries arising from an accident allegedly due to negligent maintenance of a road on federal 
property. 
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from PACER for analysis168 and created a coding protocol. Inter-coder 
reliability checks were performed before coding began.169 
Coders determined whether or not the complaint appeared to follow the 
more fact-barren Form 11 notice pleading practice or the more fact-inclusive 
narrative pleading practice.  The research design acknowledged that there are 
“imprecise boundaries”170 of what courts call notice pleading.171  Complaints 
coded as notice pleading generally contained only the basic factual 
specificity required by Form 11.  Complaints coded as narrative pleading 
incorporated facts that expand the complaint beyond Form 11 requirements 
and present a rational narrative that allows the reader to see “paradigms in 
human stories that help to explain the meaning of those stories.”172  Thus, 
narrative pleading goes beyond the approach of Form 11 pleading by also 
                                                                                                                                      
168. Empirical studies of the contents of federal civil complaints as they relate to legal standards are 
rare.  The most similar study we have found are the studies of contents of complaints filed under 
the PSLRA (See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study 
of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 125, 142 (2005), and the content of patent complaints as they relate to claims of willful 
infringement patents (See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent 
Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (2004)).  Boyd and colleagues examined the interrelationship 
among causes of action in civil complaints to illustrate the relationship of legal claims to one 
another, the broader composition of lawsuits in trial courts, and the breadth of pleading in individual 
complaints, but does not attempt to relate these legal claims to changes in legal standards (Christina 
L. Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal 
Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253 (2013)).  See also Theodore Eisenberg, Section 
1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 524, 535 n.237 
(1982) (examination of the contents of complaints in civil rights cases); William Bennett 
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979) (examining the content of complaints in prisoner civil rights litigation); 
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (examining the content of 
complaints in prisoner civil rights litigation); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality 
of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1983) (examining cases in that included 
a complaint for a constitutional tort filed under Section 1983); David A. Hoffman et al., 
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. L. REV. 681 (2007) (finding that formal 
opinions are rarely written in cases); Matthew Sag, Empirical Studies of Copyright Litigation: 
Nature of Suit Coding, 100 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330256 (discussing reliance on nature of suit coding in PACER records 
and providing reference to a working paper by Christopher Cotropia and James Gibson entitled 
Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation that examines the importance 
of using federal dockets in empirical research.). 
169. The coders both coded the same sixty complaints, and agreed on the characterization of the 
complaint as following notice pleading or narrative pleading practice in fifty-seven or 94% of the 
cases.  Agreement was lower in the secondary coding of types of facts appearing in the narrative 
pleadings, but still exceeded 70% in all but the “other” miscellaneous category of facts. 
170. Fairman, supra note 37, at 998.  
171. The coding standards recognize the impracticality of expecting every complaint to strictly adhere 
to the bare-bones sufficiency of the notice pleading practice set forth in Form 11.  Hence, the coders 
regarded slight deviations from Form 11 or the incorporation of a few additional facts as still 
classifying as being within the notice pleading practice.  This slight default to notice pleading was 
expanded even further in Study 2.  
172. Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15. J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 20 (2009). 
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including additional facts that add descriptive color and persuasiveness to the 
legal arguments.173  If a complaint was characterized as narrative pleading, 
the coders then indicated which of eight types of facts appeared in the 
complaint.174  
Overall, the results showed that in 2006 complaints in federal 
automobile accident cases were already providing many additional facts far 
beyond what was necessary under Form 11 and the notice pleading standard 
of Conley.  In the 187 analyzed complaints, 172, or 92%, departed from the 
notice pleading practice and included additional facts sufficient to define the 
complaint as representative of narrative pleading.  The narrative pleading 
complaints were also significantly longer than those few complaints that 
followed the notice pleading model, as would be expected given that the 
inclusion of additional facts beyond Form 11’s requirements would require 
additional space.  The 173 narrative pleading complaints averaged 4.9 pages, 
while the fourteen notice pleading complaints averaged 3.2 pages.175  The 
shortest complaints for each type were two pages each, while the longest 
complaint in the sample, one defined as a narrative pleading was twenty-three 
pages.176 
The 172 narrative pleading complaints provided a variety of facts. The 
most common narrative, in 135, or 72%, of all complaints described facts to 
establish negligence.  For example, the complaint in Manuell v. United States 
Postal Service exceeded the Form 11 requirements by alleging almost a page 
of negligence facts such as failing to observe signs and signals, failing to give 
adequate and timely signal, notice, or warning, and operating without regard 
to the rights and safety of the plaintiff. 177  This far exceeded the Form 11 
template of “the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the 
plaintiff.”178 
Ninety-one, or 49%, of the complaints included factual details about the 
accident.  While facts about the accident often coincided with facts to 
establish negligence, as in Manuell, only eighty-three of the complaints 
included both fact types.  Thus, while it is not uncommon for a complaint to 
                                                                                                                                      
173. Id. 
174. The eight types of facts coded in the narrative complaints were: description of plaintiff’s injuries, 
description of plaintiff, description of defendant, accident detail, vehicle descriptions, location of 
accident, vehicle damage, establishment of negligence, and other.  
175. A t-test found a significant difference based on complaint type, t (185) = - 2.542, p < .05.  Of course, 
the large majority of complaints coded in this sample were narrative pleading cases, resulting in a 
small sample of notice pleading complaints and less possible variability in their complaint lengths. 
176. Overall, the average page length was 4.7 pages.  
177. Complaint at 4, Manuell v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 1:06-cv-11430-THK (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2006).  
178. See FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11.  One reviewer of this study stated that a long list of template-like 
negligence claims should not be considered to exceed the requirements of notice pleading. 
However, as the facts in these cases could easily conform to the Form 11 guidance of “the defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff,” the inclusion of any additional facts should 
be treated as exceeding those requirements.  This issue is further addressed in the second study. 
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detail the accident without also extending the description to establish 
negligence, it is still of note that both fact types go beyond the Form 11 notice 
pleading requirements.  
Ninety-six, or 52%, of the complaints included details about the nature 
and extent of the injuries allegedly suffered.  In Bethey v. United States Postal 
Service, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff “has sustained injuries 
including but not limited to left trapezius muscle spasm, lumbar sprain and 
strain, and cervical sprain and strain, injury to his nervous and muscular 
systems all of which claims maybe [sic] permanent and cause a serious and 
permanent impairment of bodily function and emotional and mental distress 
and may continue to suffer same.”179  Again, this exceeded the Form 11 
notice pleading requirements. 
Eighty-four, or 45%, of complaints also often included vehicle 
descriptions, and seventy-seven, or 41%, of complaints included information 
about the specific location of the accident.  For example, in Harrington v. 
United States, the complaint alleged that,  
Douglas Allen Kopp, an employee of Defendant United States of America 
acting within the scope of his employment, was driving a 1983 AM General, 
Model No. M915A1 owned by Defendant also northbound on Interstate 95 
in the right lane.  As both northbound lanes of Interstate 95 slowed due to 
bridge construction . . . .180  
The complaints on occasion included details of damage sustained by the 
vehicles, such as “Plaintiff’s vehicle has a smashed-in passenger door and 
gas leak . . . .”181  This additional fact type, extent of damage to the vehicles, 
was found in forty-four, or 24%, of the complaints.  All three fact types 
shown in this complaint exceeded the requirements.  Less commonly, some 
complaints also included descriptions of the plaintiff, in fourteen, or 7%, or 
defendant, in eight, or 4%.182  
Looking across the fifty-nine districts in the random sample, there was 
no significant difference between districts in whether the pleadings 
represented notice or narrative pleading,183 or any significant differences in 
                                                                                                                                      
179. Complaint at 3, Bethay v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 2:06-cv-01123 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2006).  
Original Form 9 did include the fact that the plaintiff suffered a broken leg.  The injuries listed in 
the 2006 complaints typically offered much more detail regarding the injury.  If, however, additional 
details regarding the nature of the injury are excluded from consideration, 87% of the complaints 
still included facts that exceeded those listed in Original Form 9.  Approximately 78% of the 
complaints included at least two different types of facts that exceeded those listed in Form 11, and 
38% of the complaints included four or more types of facts that exceeded those listed in Form 11. 
180. Complaint at 2, Harrington v. United States, No. 4:06-cv-00285 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2006).  
181. Complaint at 3, Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 2:06-cv-7864 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 2006).  
182. For examples of party descriptions, see Complaint, Ferrando v. United States, No. 2:06-cv-433 (D. 
Az. Feb. 10, 2006).  
183. F (58, 186) = .922, p = .63.  
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complaint page length.184  This suggests that narrative pleading was 
widespread across federal judicial districts in 2006 and not just limited to 
some select districts. 
C.  Narrative Pleading Study 2: Methodology and Results 
Upon finding in Study 1 that initial complaints in federal jurisdiction 
automobile negligence cases included facts beyond those required by Form 
11 and notice pleading, we sought to confirm this finding in a related, smaller 
sample of cases.  Responding to a reviewer’s comment that complaints in 
cases brought against the United States likely have more fully developed 
factual statements in anticipation of the administrative hurdles and levels of 
review the case will encounter, we selected a second random sample of ninety 
auto accident tort cases from fifty-seven different federal districts originally 
filed in federal district courts in 2006, before Twombly, asserting diversity 
jurisdiction.185  
We also used Study 2 to respond to a comment at the 2013 Conference 
on Empirical Legal Studies that we should not consider negligence facts 
beyond the language presented in the Forms as a reason to classify pleading 
practice as narrative.  The commentator stated that template-like restatements 
of all of the elements of negligence, with factual support, is a bare bones, rote 
list that should be considered in line with notice pleading.  We disagree and 
believe that providing negligence facts that exceed the Form requirements 
should be considered just that—facts exceeding the requirements to promote 
a narrative, especially when the Form provides specific guidance on wording.  
Still, to explore the commenter’s suggestion further, in Study 2 we 
expanded which complaints could be classified as notice pleading.  In Study 
1, a complaint was classified as notice pleading if it did not present any of 
the fact types we explored.  In Study 2, a complaint that included additional 
negligence facts, but no other fact types, would still be classified as notice 
pleading.186  By not including the most common category of additional facts, 
                                                                                                                                      
184. F (58, 186) = 1.01, p = .48.  
185. The comment came to us after our submission of an earlier version of this study to the 2013 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.  As with Study 1, we excluded pro se cases, and cases 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Using the Integrated Database file of federal civil cases filed in 
calendar year 2006, we selected cases based on the following criteria:  NOS=350 & ORIGIN=1 & 
FYR=2006 & PROSE=0 & JURIS=4 & DISP ne 3 (i.e., automobile tort cases, originally filed in 
federal district court in 2006 by a represented plaintiff, asserting diversity jurisdiction, and not 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).  We then downloaded the initial complaints from PACER for 
analysis.  After downloading the cases, we removed cases where the initial complaint was filed in 
state court and one case where the complaint was not available on PACER. 
186. Further limiting what we placed in the narrative pleading practice category, we also removed four 
cases from being considered narrative pleading that only had negligence facts and the license plate 
of one or more vehicles. 
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we expected that a smaller percentage of complaints187 would be classified 
as narrative pleading practice. 
Even with a much stricter definition on what we considered narrative 
pleading, seventy-two, or 86%, of the eighty-four analyzed complaints 
departed from the notice pleading practice by including additional facts 
sufficient to meet our narrative pleading practice definition.  This is less than 
the 92% found in Study 1, but provides solid evidence that pleading practice 
did not match Form 11 or notice pleading practice in 2006 in automobile 
injury cases.  Additional facts other than negligence facts were regularly 
included in the initial complaints.  
As in Study 1, the narrative pleading complaints were significantly 
longer.  The seventy-two narrative pleading complaints averaged 5.76 pages, 
while the twenty notice pleading complaints averaged 2.35 pages.188  The 
page length ranged from two to nineteen pages, with an average page length 
of 5.5 pages, which was slightly longer than the average page length of 4.7 
pages in Study 1.  As with Study 1, the complaints did not differ across 
districts for either whether or not they were classified as narrative pleading189 
or by page length.190  Thus, narrative pleading is common and widespread 
across districts in both study samples. 
 
Table 1. Types of Facts in Initial Complaints 
Fact Category 
Study 1 
(N = 187) 
Study 2 
(N = 84) 
Facts to establish 
negligence 
135 (72%) 63 (75%) 
Factual details about the 
accident 
91 (49%) 46 (55%) 
Details about the nature 
and extent of injuries 
96 (52%) 44 (53%) 
Vehicle descriptions 84 (45%) 39 (46%) 
Location of accident 77 (41%) 26 (31%) 
Damage to vehicles 44 (24%) 3 (4%) 
Descriptions of plaintiff 14 (7%) 9 (11%) 
Descriptions of defendant 8 (4%) 9 (11%) 
 
                                                                                                                                      
187. This would also take into account the smaller number of cases examined in Study 2.  
188. A t-test was used to determine that the groups significantly differed from each other, t (90) =  
 -4.52, p < .001.  
189. F (56, 91) = .75, p = .84. 
190. F (56, 91) = 1.30, p = .21. 
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Table 1 provides a comparison of the number and percentage of initial 
complaints in each study that included facts for each of the studied categories. 
There is strong agreement across the two studies, with similar percentages of 
complaints in each study including facts to establish negligence, details about 
the accident, details about the nature and extent of injuries, vehicle 
descriptions, and descriptions of the plaintiff.  The results in the two studies 
significantly differed only such that complaints in Study 2 were less likely to 
include facts about specific vehicle damage,191 and complaints in Study 1 
were less likely to include descriptions of the defendant.192  Otherwise, the 
occurrence of fact types did not significantly differ between the studies. This 
warrants additional discussion into why this type of complaint, when the 
United States is a party, more often includes vehicle descriptions and less 
often describes the defendant.   
V.  DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
The results were far more convincing than we expected.  When we 
began, we intended to determine the extent to which Twombly and Iqbal 
transformed pleading practices (if at all) from the notice pleading model in 
Conley and exemplified by Form 11 (previously Form 9) to a more fact-based 
model of narrative pleading.  Earlier studies found that while fact-based 
pleading was common in more complex cases, “simplified notice pleading 
still dominates” in negligence cases and reflected the Form 9/11 pleading 
model, though pleading practice had not been examined with the same 
experimental rigor.193  
 We expected to find fact-based pleading in fewer than half of the cases 
filed in 2006, and intended to then look at similar complaints after Iqbal to 
assess any change in movement toward fact-based pleading.  Instead, we 
found that prior to Twombly complaints in simple automobile accident 
negligence cases were rich with facts that far exceeded the requirements of 
Form 11.  With more than 90% of these cases including facts that exceeded 
the guidance of Form 11, we saw no need to examine post-Iqbal pleading 
                                                                                                                                      
191. t (32.6) = 5.24, p < .001.  
192. t (14.5) = -2.22, p < .05.  
193. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1051; See DODSON, supra note 23, at 132–33 (“The beautiful simplicity 
of the Federal Forms has never been a reliable model.  Few filed complaints are as Spartan.”).  As 
support for arguing that it is a myth that “plaintiffs plead barebones complaints,” Dodson cited Ettie 
Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
893, 899 (2008).  Ward, in turn, cited the earlier review by Fairman, supra note 37.  At the time of 
Fairman’s review, his study of federal case law suggested that notice pleading was a myth, but not 
in negligence such as those examined here.  Of course, Fairman focused on pleading standards and 
not pleading practice and so there is a chance that pleading practice in negligence cases had already 
shifted away from notice pleading practice before his review.  If so, this only strengthens the 
argument that Twombly and Iqbal did not cause the shift from notice pleading to narrative pleading 
practice.  
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practice to determine if notice pleading died with Twombly and Iqbal.  We 
encourage others to replicate our findings in other case types and to perform 
before and after comparisons. 
An anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper remarked, 
“[N]o one has thought that federal complaints typically look like Form 9/11.”  
This argument provides additional support that, even when the Supreme 
Court supported the notice pleading standard, pleading practice had already 
shifted to narrative pleading before Twombly and Iqbal were decided.  As 
shown in Part IV, the infrequency of notice pleading and pervasiveness of 
narrative pleading prior to Twombly, even in simple automobile accident 
cases, supports the notion that notice pleading may have yielded to narrative 
pleading decades ago, if it existed in any meaningful form at all. Those who 
believe that Twombly and Iqbal killed notice pleading practice should first 
demonstrate that there was a period since the adoption of the Federal Rules 
when pleading practice met (but did not exceed) the notice pleading standard 
requirements, or acknowledge that the practice might have only existed in 
spirit, despite support for the pleading standard. 
Narrative pleading prior to Twombly may explain why most empirical 
studies show that there is only a modest, if any, increase in the likelihood that 
motions to dismiss were ultimately granted and cases dismissed after 
Iqbal.194  If litigants were already pleading more facts to support a narrative 
pleading, a new, heightened standard requiring them to plead facts showing 
a claim is plausible would not be a dramatic shift in practice.  In different 
types of cases, “more or less description may be inherent”195 to provide a 
general description called for under notice pleading standards.  In practice, 
the findings of this study might support the conclusion expressed in a 
memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Judicial 
Conference Standing Rules Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure:  
“The approach taken by many courts may suggest that Twombly and Iqbal 
are providing a new framework in which to analyze familiar pleading 
concepts, rather than an entirely new pleading standard.”196  The Supreme 
                                                                                                                                      
194. Another possible explanation for the modest change in grant rates is that changes in the litigation 
and settlement strategies of plaintiffs may have shifted the mix of cases so that grant rate alone is a 
misleading indicator of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal.  Hubbard’s close examination of the 
outcome of cases filed before Twombly and decided after Twombly revealed no evidence of such a 
selection effect due to Twombly.  See also Hubbard, supra note 11 (“I find that Twombly precipitated 
no significant change in dismissal rates, even after accounting for selection effects.”).  But see 
GELBACH, supra note 17, for an elaboration of this concern involving analysis of selection effects 
and grant rates following Iqbal. 
195. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1001.  
196. Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to J. Lee H. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules 
Comm. and Standing Rules Comm. 5 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/iqbal_memo_121510.pdf. 
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Court decisions might just have been “the latest steps in a long-term trend 
that has favored increasingly early case disposition.”197 
A.  Discussion of the Federal Rules 
Over the past three decades, Federal Rules amendments might have had 
an incidental effect of encouraging narrative pleading, with the inclusion of 
the factual circumstances of the case to achieve other purposes.  Movement 
toward a more active role for judges in the pretrial stages of litigation requires 
judges to obtain an early awareness of the underlying facts of the case, and 
such facts are now often presented as part of the pleadings to inform the 
judges of circumstances that may be relevant to early case management 
decisions. 
1.  Federal Rules Changes and Pleading Practice 
The clearest example of Federal Rules amendments driving factual 
pleading is the amendment of Rule 16 in 1983 and 1993, allowing judges to 
convene an early pretrial conference to resolve preliminary issues and to 
prepare a schedule for litigation that is suited to the issues in the case.198  Rule 
16(b)(2) requires the court to issue a scheduling order within 120 days after 
the complaint is served on the defendant.199  Rule 16(b)(3) indicates that the 
scheduling order must include a schedule for amendment of pleadings and 
completion of discovery, among other things.200  In order to obtain the 
information necessary to develop such a scheduling order, Rule 16(c)(2) 
allows the judge to convene a pretrial conference.201  
                                                                                                                                      
197. Miller, supra note 5, at 9, 10 (“today’s civil litigation is neither civil nor litigation as previously 
known.”). 
198. For a discussion of the evolution of recommendations regarding judicial management of pretrial 
proceedings presented in the original Manual for Complex Litigation (1968) into the 1983 
amendments to Federal Rule 16 authorizing more assertive judicial management of pretrial stages 
of litigation, see Miller, supra note 5, at 294–95. 
199. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2).   
200.  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3).  
201. Among the issues the court may consider at such an initial conference are:  
(A) formulating and simplifying the issues, and eliminating frivolous claims or defenses;  
(B) amending the pleadings if necessary or desirable;  
(C) obtaining admissions and stipulations about facts and documents to avoid 
unnecessary proof, and ruling in advance on the admissibility of evidence;  
. . .  
(F) controlling and scheduling discovery, including orders affecting disclosures and 
discovery under Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37;  
(G) identifying witnesses and documents, scheduling the filing and exchange of any 
pretrial briefs, and setting dates for further conferences and for trial  
. . .  
(P) facilitating in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action 
 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2). 
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Judicial consideration of such issues at an early litigation stage has 
prodded plaintiffs to include sufficient facts in the complaint to allow them 
to defend their litigation strategies at the initial pretrial conference.202  By 
providing an extensive account of the factual circumstances that underlie the 
claims in the complaint itself, the plaintiff then will inform the judge of the 
narrative that the attorney intends to present and the role of such facts in 
supporting the claims.   
Amendments of civil rules to control abuses of litigation have also 
resulted in a greater emphasis on fact pleading.  For example, in 1983 and 
again in 1993, Rule 11 was amended to impose a clearer duty on attorneys to 
undertake a factual investigation of the basis of pleadings prior to filing.203  
The possibility of being sanctioned by the court, including possible payment 
of costs and attorney fees, for filing an improper pleading can encourage 
attorneys to include more facts in the complaint in order to demonstrate that 
they had undertaken a proper investigation.204 
Furthermore, since 1938, there have been at least ten amendments to 
Rule 26.  The 1993 and 2000 amendments to Rule 26(a) encouraged earlier 
disclosure of factual information by the parties, and some of this disclosure 
may take place as part of the pleadings.  Under Rule 26(a), parties must 
disclose information that would appear to far exceed what is required by the 
notice pleading standard.205  The 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b) narrowed 
                                                                                                                                      
202. Related amendments to Rule 26(f) require the attorneys to meet and confer prior to the initial Rule 
16 scheduling conference to “consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the 
possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures required 
by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information; and develop a 
proposed discovery plan.”  FED R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).  The need to disclose information necessary to 
develop such a discovery plan also encourages the plaintiff to disclose facts related to the underlying 
claims in the case.  This was especially true from 1993 to 2000, when Rule 26(a)(1) required initial 
disclosure only with regard to “disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings”.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
203. Attorneys are now required to certify that each filing:  
(1) [] is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;  
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by 
a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law;  
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation 
or discovery; and  
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. 
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  
204. This was especially true following the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, which allowed a greater 
opportunity for sanctions than the 1993 amendment.  See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 925 
(1989). See also Ellis & Shah, supra note 13, at 69-70.  
205. Parties must disclose to the opposing party, without waiting for a request, “the name and, if known, 
the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information—
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the scope of discovery as a matter of right from material relevant to the 
“subject matter” of the litigation to material relevant to the claims and 
defenses raised in the litigation.206  These amendments encouraged the 
plaintiffs to include more specific claims in the complaint in order to retain a 
broad scope of discovery, and thereby might have resulted in complaints that 
include greater factual specificity regarding the nature of the litigation.  
Combined, the increased emphasis on early disclosure of detailed 
information, including the factual foundations for the claim, and restricting 
discovery to the claims and defenses raised in the litigation might result in 
litigants including more such information in the complaint, along with factual 
support.207  With proposed amendments to the Civil Rules, including changes 
to Rules 16 and 26, recently approved by the Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure,208 research should address how these changes, if 
implemented, could further affect federal pleading practice. Proposed 
changes to Rule 26, for example, would narrow the scope of discovery, which 
led to some of the most vocal opposition when the rules package was 
submitted for public comment.  
2.  Discovery and Pleading Standards   
Heightened pleading standards have been regarded as a response to, and 
remedy for, escalating discovery costs.  In 1987, Judge Easterbrook stated 
that, regarding judicial supervision of the discovery process, “the judicial 
                                                                                                                                      
along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims 
or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i).  
Under Rule 26(a)(3),  
[A] party must provide to the other parties and promptly file the following information 
about the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:  
(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each 
witness—separately identifying those the party expects to present and those it may call 
if the need arises;  
(ii) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony the party expects to present by 
deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent parts of the 
deposition; and  
(iii) an identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other 
evidence—separately identifying those items the party expects to offer and those it may 
offer if the need arises. 
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3).  The 1993 amendments to Rule 26(a), establishing the duty to disclose, 
were more expansive to require identification of potential evidence “relevant to disputed facts 
alleged with particularity in the pleadings.”  This requirement would have encouraged parties to 
include greater factual detail in the complaint.  The 2000 amendments narrowed the breadth of this 
initial disclosure requirement to include identification of witnesses and documents “that the 
disclosing party may use to support its claims and defenses.”   
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
207. These emphases also likely set the stage for the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.  See Sullivan, supra 
note 23, at 56.  
208. Report from the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 161, at 13–18. 
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officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves may 
not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find.”209  
Heightened pleading standards may be particularly attractive in cases where 
the claim “is easy to allege yet risks voluminous discovery,”210 especially 
when an earlier dismissal at the pleading stage could conserve resources.211  
The Supreme Court endorsed this view, stating in Twombly that the new 
standard would protect against the costs of burdensome discovery.212  
Judge Ellis noted that the Twombly and Iqbal decisions “are inseparable 
from their underlying supposition that dramatic increases in the cost of 
litigation [,] and especially discovery [,] justified the judicial imposition of 
more rigorous pleading requirements.”213  With these new requirements, 
“federal judges are now supposed to act as gatekeepers to discovery, and the 
plausible pleading standard is supposed to be their tool to do so.”214  Some 
judges have been cautious.  After considering the interaction of 
Twombly/Iqbal and “the discovery problem” Judge Sullivan warned that 
“Problems cry out for solutions, but solutions often create newer and bigger 
problems.”215 
While reducing discovery costs is an admirable goal, such costs are 
rarely an issue in the federal negligence motor vehicle cases in this present 
study.  These cases are among the simpler types of federal cases and rarely 
involve extensive discovery.216  Apart from medical records and insurance 
information, for example, the opportunity for discovery would seem quite 
limited.  If pleading practice in these simpler cases has departed from notice 
pleading standards, the reason cannot be just a need to guard against needless 
expense and delay arising from abuse of discovery.  The departure from 
notice pleading in these cases must be in response to other concerns.  
                                                                                                                                      
209. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989).  
210. Id. at 1060.  But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to 
Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1714 (2013) (discussing three different groups of what 
Spencer calls “apologists,” people who he claims defend the Twombly and Iqbal decisions because 
they either (a) find it consistent with previous standards, (b) argue that it did not make a substantial 
impact on federal pleading practice, or (c) laud the decision as a response to escalating discovery 
costs.  Regarding the third category, Spencer also states that discovery abuse “has not been 
confirmed to exist”). 
211. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1014. 
212. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007). 
213. Ellis & Shah, supra note 13, at 66.  
214. Fitzpatrick, supra note 115, at 1629. 
215. Hon. John P. Sullivan, Do the New Pleading Standards Set Out in Twombly and Iqbal Meet the 
Needs of the Replica Jurisdictions?, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 53 (2014). 
216. E. Donald Elliott, Twombly in Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) is 
Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L. REV. 895, 908 n.53 (2012) (“When the rules were adopted in 1938, 
most cases involved simple historical facts, such as an automobile accident, for which discovery 
was self-limited by the nature of the facts in controversy.”). 
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B.  Narrative Pleading 
The data above indicate that pleading practice already gravitated toward 
fact-rich complaints before the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.  But why does 
this matter?  Does the presence of a fact-rich complaint affect the way in 
which judges consider and decide a motion to dismiss?  Conceivably, a judge 
may choose to ignore such facts for purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss 
and rely solely on whether the complaint meets the notice pleading 
requirement.  We contend, however, that judges do rely on the information 
presented and that psychological research can help explain how that 
additional information is used.  In this section we describe the characteristics 
of narrative pleading practice and how it relates to resolving motions to 
dismiss under the Conley standard and the Twombly/Iqbal standard.  We 
believe that before Twombly judges had already come to expect complaints 
with additional facts and that these facts present a narrative that can affect 
decisions regarding whether a complaint should survive a 12(b)(6) motion. 
“Narrative pervades the law.”217  Narratives, however, can be both a 
help and a hindrance to decision makers. Put simply, narrative pleading 
involves including additional facts to tell a more complete story in the 
complaint.  The use of narratives is a way to present experiences so they are 
more comprehensible and more easily processed.218  “Traditional stories are 
full of regularities” and people incorporate “such regularities into a story 
schema and make use of them during processing.”219  By relying on 
similarities between stories, people organize their many experiences into 
narratives that they then rely on when examining a situation.220  In this 
manner, a narrative within a complaint can affect how a judge reviews a civil 
complaint.  
Narrative pleading is akin to the Story Model, which posits that juror 
comprehension and performance will improve when jurors create a narrative 
story to organize all of the information that they receive during a trial.221  
                                                                                                                                      
217. Anne E. Ralph, Not the Same Old Story: Using Narrative Theory to Understand and Overcome the 
Plausibility Pleading Standard, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 33 (2014) (citing PETER BROOKS, 
Narrative in and of the Law, in A COMPANION TO NARRATIVE THEORY 415, 416 (James Phelan & 
Peter J. Rabinowitz eds., 2005).  Ralph provides an excellent summary of narrative theory, the 
characteristics of a narrative, and their relationship to the plausibility standard. 
218. Id. at 25–26. 
219. JEAN MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY, at x  
(Psychology Press 2014) (1984).   
220. Ralph, supra note 217, at 26 (citing Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily Ever After, and 
In a Galaxy Far, Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by Overreliance on 
Pure Logic in Appellate Briefs and Motion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255, 260 (2009)).  
221. See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story 
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 5001 (1991); Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, Explaining the 
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERS. & SOC. PSY. 2, 189 
(1992).  
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According to the Story Model, the juror will choose the case that is the most 
coherent, which often means choosing the story that is the most plausible and 
complete and without unexplained gaps and inconsistencies in the 
evidence.222  The same can be said for judges.  Fact-rich claims are likely to 
be more complete and should offer a coherent and plausible re-telling of the 
events leading to the case. Of course, a fact-rich complaint is not the same 
thing as a complaint that survives a 12(b)(6) motion.223  Still, it is a natural 
instinct to use all available information in its current format to construct a 
coherent account and not expend additional effort ignoring information that 
contributes to that account.224  The problems inherent in relying on these 
instincts likely existed before Twombly but were likely exacerbated after 
Iqbal, with judges relying on judicial experience and common sense when 
reviewing complaints deciding on motions to dismiss. 
The goal of the complaint is to simplify the case into a cohesive 
narrative that clearly explains why the plaintiff deserves their prayer for 
relief.  As stated by Ralph, “[O]ne way to enhance plausibility through the 
use of narrative is to include greater factual detail.”225  Taleb referred to a 
similar cognitive process as the narrative fallacy.226  He describes the fallacy 
partially as “our predilection for compact stories over raw truths” because 
information is costly to obtain, to manipulate, and to retrieve.227 This is 
especially true of litigation where the cost of obtaining sufficient information 
to survive a motion to dismiss can be high.228  
                                                                                                                                      
222. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 29 (1998) 
(citing Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making, in 
REASONING AND DECISION MAKING 123 (Philip Nicholas Johnson-Laird & Eldar Shafir eds., 
1994)). 
223. For example, see Ralph, supra note 217, at 50–52 (citing Complaint and Jury Demand, HDC, LLC 
v. City of Ann Arbor, No. 09-14027, 2010 WL 2232220 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2010), aff’d 675 F.3d 
608 (6th Cir. 2012).  
224. Barbara A. Mellers, A. Schwartz & A.D.J. Cooke, Judgment and Decision Making, 49 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 447, 455 (1998).  This has also been referred to as the concreteness principle, which 
would find it unlikely that a judge would transform a narrative pleading complaint into a notice 
pleading complaint when deciding on a 12(b)(6) motion. See Paul Slovic, From Shakespeare to 
Simon: Speculations—And Some Evidence—About Man's Ability to Process Information, 12 OR. 
RES. INST. BULL. 1 (1972). 
225. Ralph, supra note 217, at 35.  
226. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 62-84 
(2007) (“The narrative fallacy addresses our limited ability to look at sequences of facts without 
weaving an explanation into them, or, equivalently, forcing a logical link, an arrow of relationship, 
upon them.  Explanations bind facts together.  The make them all the more easily remembered; they 
help them make more sense.  Where this propensity can go wrong is when it increases our 
impression of understanding.”  Id. at 64 (emphasis in original)). 
227. Id. at 68.  
228. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL 
CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES, (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf; see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the 
Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765 (2010).  
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The desire to create stories out of facts stems from how the brain 
processes information.229  A clear, cohesive narrative can enhance a decision 
maker’s ability to see causation between the presented elements and make 
the described events “more easily remembered . . . and make more sense.”230  
If the use of narrative can affect causal judgments, it is easy to see how 
narrative pleading can have an effect on how judges consider negligence 
cases.  Ralph suggests that “greater awareness of narrative theory and greater 
reliance on narrative techniques can help litigants and judges understand and 
comply with the plausibility standard.”231  However, Ralph’s article appears 
to assume that narrative pleading is a novel way to respond to Twombly and 
Iqbal, rather than a pleading practice that was already common before those 
cases.  Narrative pleading is not new.  In addition, while Ralph presents an 
impressive review of narrative pleading and the law, she does not 
acknowledge many of the concerns presented by Taleb and others regarding 
the use of narratives and schemas. 
C.  Decision Making Concerns 
“Good judgment requires an analysis of content, in addition to laws, 
principles, and axioms.”232  We have shown that the content of complaints 
resembled narrative pleading before Iqbal.  In this section, we now argue that 
problems associated with this additional information could change how a 
judge considers a motion to dismiss, regardless of whether she uses a notice 
pleading or plausibility pleading standard.233  
The narrative format presents judges with far more information than the 
bare bones notice pleading of Form 11.  When faced with a fact-rich 
narrative, the Conley test, which asks if the plaintiff can prove any set of facts 
in support of his claim, makes little sense.  The judge need not imagine such 
a set of facts; the facts that will be relied on have already been set forth to 
meet the early information requirements of the Federal Rules.  The proffer of 
such facts invites the judge to become more involved earlier in structuring 
the litigation, as intended by the Rule 16 amendments.  In developing a 
scheduling order for amendment of pleadings and completion of discovery, 
                                                                                                                                      
229. TALEB, supra note 226, at 68–69.  Taleb refers to the idea that the more you summarize information, 
the more ordered it becomes, and, accordingly, the less random, as “Andrey Nikolayevich’s Rule” 
and noted that “myths impart order to the disorder of human perception.”  Id. at 69.  For the seminal 
book on the psychology of decision making and heuristics, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS & BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky & Paul Slovic eds., 1982). 
230. TALEB, supra note 226, at 64.  
231. Ralph, supra note 217, at 2. 
232. Mellers, Schwartz & Cooke, supra note 224, at 450 (citing research from Gerd Gigerenzer).  
233. While the additional facts can lead to the decision making errors described in this section and while 
we believe that these errors existed long before Twombly and Iqbal, we also believe that the 
plausibility standard exacerbates the likelihood of these errors due to a new, undefined reliance on 
judicial experience and common sense.  
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the judge will become familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the 
plaintiff’s case.  Any preliminary disputes over the breadth of proposed 
discovery also will require close consideration of the factual basis of claims 
presented in the complaint.  Accordingly, the additional information that 
comes along with narrative pleading practice presents a judge with a very 
different, and more complex, decision making context than the one 
anticipated by Conley.  
Research by Kahneman and Tversky, among others, has demonstrated 
that human judgments cannot be properly understood without taking into 
account the context or “frames” in which the judgment is made.234  In this 
instance, the decision task regarding whether the complaint should be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim is very different when presented with a 
fact-rich narrative complaint, even if the Conley “any set of facts” notice 
pleading standard remains.  Research about human decision making indicates 
that it is unreasonable to expect judges to ignore what they have learned about 
a case from a fact-rich narrative pleading, and try to imagine if there may be 
some alternative set of facts that would provide proper support for the 
plaintiff’s claim.  With narrative pleading and additional facts, judges will 
attempt to make the most informed decision based on the available 
information, resulting in a different decision process, even under the 
traditional notice pleading standard.  
With the advent of the plausibility pleading standard, the Supreme 
Court may have inadvertently created additional problems for judicial 
decision making.  Judges have always faced potential decision making errors 
(heuristics235) when deciding motions to dismiss.  By inviting judges to rely 
on their “judicial experience and common sense”236 the Supreme Court 
encouraged reliance on factors that may differ greatly across judges, thereby 
creating potential inconsistencies in the application of pleading standards. 
Moreover, judges’ experience and common sense are “highly subjective 
concepts largely devoid of accepted—let alone universal—meaning.”237  
When the terminology cannot be consistently defined, judges’ interpretations 
will almost always vary. One would expect that “reasonable judges could 
                                                                                                                                      
234. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 
SCI. 453 (1981); see also Ian K. Belton, Mary Thomson & Mandeep K. Dhami, Lawyer and 
Nonlawyer Susceptibility to Framing Effects in Out-of-Court Civil Litigation Settlement, 11 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 578 (2014).  
235. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS & BIASES, supra note 229.  
236. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
237. Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement 
of Arthur M. Miller), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller091027.pdf. 
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disagree” 238 when using their own experience and common sense, and this 
could result in inconsistent decisions, despite any best intentions.239  
Twombly and Iqbal encourage judges to search for gaps and to assess 
the plausibility of the narrative by relying, in part, on their judicial experience 
and common sense.  A more fact-rich complaint offers additional information 
to allow the creation of a coherent narrative.  Greater factual detail may 
benefit the plaintiff when the judge considers whether the plaintiff’s 
complaint states a claim. However, providing additional information does not 
necessarily lead to better decision making. For example, narrative complaints 
might be, by their very nature, intended to bias a decision maker.  As stated 
by Gewirtz, “[T]he goal of storytelling in law is to persuade an official 
decision maker that one’s story is true, to win the case . . . .”240  Adding 
additional facts to initial complaints beyond the notice pleading standard 
might be in response to changes in the Federal Rules, but they also respond 
to the psychological expectation that fully telling your story is a persuasive 
tool to be used by attorneys.  The remainder of this section will present a 
selection of cognitive biases that might affect judicial decision making and 
examine their relationship to narrative pleading.241  
Mental shortcuts, such as creating a narrative or relying on the more 
readily available information, can improve the efficiency of information 
storage and retrieval.242  As stated by Taleb, “compression is vital to the 
performance of conscious work.”243  However, compression and mental 
shortcuts can also lead to decision making errors.  
                                                                                                                                      
238. Sullivan, supra note 215, at 80.  
239. Through all of this discussion of decision making errors, it is important to note, as stated by Reinert, 
that discussions about whether judges are able to make the difficult decision of whether something 
meets the pleading standard “is not made to denigrate judges.”  Reinert, 162 U. PA. L. REV., supra 
note 15, at 1769.  Instead, judges, like all people, face limitations in how much information can be 
processed and how to do so most effectively.  Id.  (Reinert’s article focuses on plausibility pleading, 
but the psychological principles underlying his analysis also generally apply to decision making in 
the broader motion to dismiss context.).  
240. Ralph, supra note 217, at 35 (quoting Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in Law, in LAW’S 
STORIES:  NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN LAW 2, 5 (Paul Gewirtz & Peter Brooks eds., 1996). 
241. Determining how judges analyze the often-complex filings before them and what affects their 
decision making is worthy of many articles and outside the primary purpose of this one.  For an 
excellent review, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (Harvard Univ. Press 2010). 
Empirical research also continues to address this complicated issue.  For a recent example, see M. 
Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of 
Congressional Control Over Judicial Behavior (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law and Econ. Working 
Paper No. 671, 2014), available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1665&context=law_and_economics (finding that judges made a required 
certification that attorneys complied with F.R.C.P. Rule 11(b) in less than fourteen cases of cases 
in which these certifications were legally required).  
242. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE  PSYCHOL. 1, 207 (1973). 
243. TALEB, supra note 226, at 68. 
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In responding to pleadings, judges may be vulnerable to the 
confirmation bias, which occurs when someone interprets available 
information in a manner that is consistent with prior beliefs or 
expectations.244  A prevalent theme in critical thinking research and an 
important skill for judges is “to be able to decouple . . .  prior beliefs and 
opinions from the evaluation of evidence and arguments.”245  When 
presented with an initial complaint, a judge’s prior beliefs could 
unknowingly influence how he or she perceives the case.  Not only are people 
biased toward confirming their prior beliefs, they also have a difficult time 
evaluating conclusions that are inconsistent with those beliefs.246 
Additionally, recent research found that this bias does not correspond with 
intelligence or cognitive ability,247 so even the most intelligent decision 
makers might find himself or herself relying inappropriately on their earlier 
beliefs.248  
Another cognitive bias that warrants consideration is the availability 
heuristic, in which decision makers associate the likelihood of the probability 
of an event with how easily an example comes to mind.249  For example, a 
judge reading a complaint in an automobile accident case might wonder how 
similar cases were resolved and base her assessment of the complaint on the 
likelihood of success on the most easily recalled similar case.  Closely related 
to the availability heuristic is the simulation heuristic. Those using the 
simulation heuristic also rely on the mental accessibility of an event but do 
so to replace an unexpected event with a normal one when thinking 
counterfactually.250  For example, a judge presented with a complaint 
detailing how the driver of a postal truck sped through a stop sign and struck 
a pedestrian might wonder “what if the driver had stopped?”  Such a question 
                                                                                                                                      
244. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).  Some researchers refer to the similar phenomenon as myside bias.  For 
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245. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Natural Myside Bias Is Independent of Cognitive Ability, 
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247. See Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West & Maggie E. Toplak, Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and 
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in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128–32 (2012).  
249. See Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 242, at 207; see also Shari S. Diamond and Loretta J. 
Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73 (1989).  
250. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 
1998).  
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could affect how the judge pieces together the narrative underlying the 
case.251   
 Combined, confirmation bias and the availability and simulation 
heuristics are likely present when deciding under a notice pleading standard 
but even more of a concern with the plausibility pleading standard. 
Plausibility pleading, which invites judges to rely on their own experience 
and common sense, may leave judges more vulnerable to such decision 
making biases when considering a motion to dismiss.  Judges have different 
judicial experiences and, accordingly, these differential experiences could 
lead to inconsistencies in how they apply their judicial experience when 
considering motions to dismiss.  In his recent article, Reinert argues that 
judges might not be able to rely on their own judicial experience and could 
be vulnerable to cognitive biases when making decisions.252  Reinert cites the 
significant decrease in the number of trials, growth of alternative dispute 
resolution procedures, confidential settlement agreements, and protective 
orders keeping discovery confidential as reasons why judges are unable to 
easily compare an instant case to their prior experiences.253  If judges are 
seeing fewer trials and settlement agreements are not disclosed, the judge 
will have less experience on which to base his or her plausibility assessment.  
With less relatable information, judges might become increasingly 
vulnerable to errors in decision making.254 
However, the solution is not to provide judges with more information. 
As stated by Taleb, “The more information you give someone, the more 
hypotheses they will formulate along the way, and the worse off they will be. 
They see more random noise and mistake it for information.”255  Once 
someone obtains the minimum information necessary to make a decision, 
additional information does not improve the accuracy of a judgment, only a 
                                                                                                                                      
251. For the seminal review of counterfactual thinking, see Neal Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 
PSYCHOL. BULL.1, 133 (1997).  One of the authors performed an experimental study on how mock 
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254. Reinert explains that “the dearth of judicial experience may partly explain why, as the available 
empirical data suggest, plausibility pleading has not effectively filtered cases on the basis of merit.” 
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puzzle.” (DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 201 (2013)).  
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person’s confidence in it.256  Instead, we believe the next step is to 
acknowledge that narrative pleading practice pervaded federal complaints 
before Twombly and that research must address how to combat the potentially 
negative effects of such additional information, especially under a 
plausibility pleading standard that invites inconsistencies based upon a 
judge’s own experiences.  
D.  Study Limitations and Next Steps 
This study, like all empirical studies, faces limitations.  We do not claim 
that Twombly and Iqbal had no effect on pleading practice.  Preliminary 
research performed by the authors has found that narrative pleading practice 
has become more detailed after Iqbal in types of cases that are often the 
object of a motion to dismiss.257  Twombly and Iqbal might have changed 
pleading practice, but they did not kill notice pleading. It was already on its 
way out of practice.  
                                                                                                                                      
256. See RICHARD J. HEUER, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS (2006) (providing an 
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In addition, Paul Slovic conducted a study of expert handicappers for horse races and found that, as 
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judgments can be predicted by only a few cues.”  Paul Slovic, Talk Presented at The Institute for 
Quantitative Research in Finance, Behavioral Problems of Adhering to a Decision Policy (May 1, 
1973); see also Paul Slovic, Dan Fleissner & W. Scott Bauman, Analyzing the Use of Information 
in Investment Decision Making: A Methodological Proposal, J. BUS., 45, 283–301 (1972). 
257. Preliminary findings involving a limited number of cases suggest that Twombly and Iqbal may have 
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themselves.  We compared the page length of complaints filed before Twombly and after Iqbal in 
several different types of cases.  We found that in types of cases in which motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim are rare, the page length of complaints filed after Iqbal changed very little 
(page length in auto accident cases decreased by 10%, from 6.9 pages to 6.2 pages (n.s. p<0.520), 
and in ERISA cases increased by 9%, from 7.9 pages to 8.6 pages (n.s. p<0.521)).  However, page 
length of complaints filed after Iqbal increased greatly in employment discrimination cases in which 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are more common (page length in employment 
discrimination cases increased by 74% from 9.3 pages to 16.3 pages (p<0.028).  Page length in 
antitrust cases also increased by 30%, from 29.3 pages to 38.1 pages, but was not statistically 
significant due to the small number of antitrust cases in the pilot sample (n.s. p<0.109).  These 
findings are consistent with recent surveys that have asked attorneys for their impressions of the 
effects of Twombly and Iqbal on their litigation practices.  In general these surveys find that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in cases likely to face a motion to dismiss are responding by adding facts to 
their complaints rather than choosing not to file cases that will be tested by the more demanding 
pleading standard.  See LEE, supra note 135, and EMERY G. LEE III AND THOMAS E. WILLGING, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR, ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,  
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 12 (Mar. 2010), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv2.pdf/$file/costciv2.pdf (70% of 
employment discrimination plaintiff attorneys indicated that the Supreme Court cases have affected 
their practice, and of those reporting an effect, 94% reporting that they now include more factual 
allegations in the complaint). 
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One may argue that automobile accident cases are not representative of 
the diverse federal caseload, and we agree.  Automobile accident cases 
present straightforward issues that arise in the federal courts.258  They are 
“relatively uncomplicated civil actions”259 and the “archetypal notice 
pleading claim.”260  If notice pleading is not occurring in such simple, 
“archetypal” cases that have the benefit of Form 11, then it is also unlikely 
to be occurring in more complex cases that have no such guidance.  It raises 
strong doubt that notice pleading was the dominant practice before Twombly 
or that complaints matched Form 11.  Still, additional research should 
examine whether these findings generalize to other case types and whether 
the findings here accurately reflect the prevalence of narrative pleading 
before Twombly. 
Form 11 also comes into question due to its use of words such as 
“negligently,” which rides a thin line between factual allegation and legal 
conclusion.  Miller states, 
If it is considered a fact, courts should accept an allegation of negligent 
conduct as true and thereby confirm that Form 11 remains a sufficient 
model for this category of actions. On the other hand, if courts begin 
interpreting “negligently” as a legal conclusion, plaintiffs may have to 
channel tort law and specify the factual elements to qualify as a plausible 
claim.  For example, plaintiffs may have to recite the precise actions taken 
or not taken by a defendant motorist that made his or her driving 
negligent.261  
If courts take the former approach, the narrative pleading that existed before 
Twombly should still survive a motion to dismiss.  If courts take the latter 
approach, pleadings that already exceeded Form 11 might need to include 
even more factual support.  An argument could be made that litigants 
throughout history “played it safe” and always pled negligence complaints 
with greater specificity.  Consequently, the shift in pleading practice pre- and 
post-Twombly might be more pronounced in other types of complaints, but it 
should not alter the finding that narrative pleading was common before 
Twombly. 
                                                                                                                                      
258. Federal case weights assign motor vehicle accident cases a weight that is somewhat less than the 
typical federal case.  FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY, 
Appendix Y: Final Weights Material Presented to the Statistics Subcommittee, 2 tbl.4 (2005), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.nsf/ 
inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/665 (assigning a weight of 0.90 to motor 
vehicle accident cases, relative to a 1.00 weight of a typical federal case). 
259. Miller, supra note 5, at 40.   
260. Fairman, supra note 37, at 1047.  Recall that Fairman’s review of case law indicated that while 
non-notice pleading was common in more complex cases, notice pleading dominated in negligence 
cases.  Id. at 1051. 
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One reason why some researchers do not find major differences in the 
rate at which motions to dismiss are granted before Twombly and after Iqbal 
may be that this narrative pleading practice that includes additional facts 
became common before the Supreme Court cases were decided.  If fact-rich 
complaints were common before Twombly, then comparison of grant rates of 
motions to dismiss before and after Twombly and Iqbal may show smaller 
than expected change, even if the articulated reasons for resolving motions 
challenging such pleadings could have differed significantly due to the 
heightened plausibility standard. 
In 1986, academic debate greeted the Supreme Court’s trilogy of 
summary judgment cases.262  In response, commentators criticized the Court 
for making it easier for defendants to be granted summary judgment. 
However, despite concerns after the decisions were announced, empirical 
research found that the likelihood that a case contained one or more summary 
judgment motions had already increased before the 1986 cases.263 The 
research here is a first step toward a comparable finding, though about 
attorney pleading practice.  Despite much fervor over how the Supreme Court 
decisions would revolutionize federal practice, narrative pleading practice 
was already common before Twombly and lower courts had already started 
to adopt heightened pleading standards. 
As we noted at the outset, it is important to distinguish pleading 
standards enforced by the courts from pleading practices adopted by 
attorneys in filing a complaint.  This was a study of pleading practices, 
showing that the factual content of complaints before Twombly far exceeded 
the modest factual requirements of notice pleading.  Pleading standards set a 
minimum requirement for pleading practices. Some may argue that, despite 
the extensive recitation of facts in complaints at the time of Twombly, the 
courts still measured pleadings by the notice pleading standard and the Form 
11 template and ignored supplemental facts. However, as noted in Part III, 
Dodson found that, before Twombly, 25.3% of dismissed claims were 
dismissed because of insufficient facts264 and, as noted in Part V(C), that 
would be hard to do from a psychological perspective. 
Our study indicates that narrative pleading was already common before 
Twombly.  We believe this is partially a result of the Federal Rules 
amendments that encouraged providing information early in the litigation in 
attempts for more effective judicial case management.  Moreover, we believe 
that the current Form 11 does not meaningfully aid litigants because judges 
have now come to expect more developed narrative pleading and the form 
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might set an inadequate baseline for litigants.265  Additional research might 
find and address pleadings that follow the Form 11 format and explore if the 
surprisingly high percentage of narrative pleading negligence complaints 
mapped onto other case types as well.  However, with the Judicial 
Conference recently recommending the abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms, 
future research might better address whether such actions will further affect 
pleading practice.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Most critics of Twombly and Iqbal see those cases as a sharp departure 
from past notice pleading standards that caused changes in pleading practice.  
However, while we recognize the change between a notice and plausibility 
pleading standard and the concerns with plausibility pleading, recent research 
presents two factual oddities that cause us to question whether notice 
pleading practice, at least as intended by the drafters, was common before 
Twombly.  
First, Twombly and Iqbal did not create a new era of narrative pleading.  
Instead, narrative pleading was already common before Twombly. Our 
studies demonstrate that pleadings rich with facts were common prior to 
Twombly and that pleading in complaints in federal automobile accident 
cases departed from the notice pleading practice expressed by the drafters of 
the Federal Rules in Form 11.  Our studies show that, in 2006, in about nine 
out of ten cases, plaintiffs in straightforward automobile accident negligence 
cases alleged far more facts in the complaint than required by the notice 
pleading practice recommended by Form 11.  Such supplemental facts 
offered more detailed information about the circumstances of the accident, 
the nature of the injuries, and the parties.  Second, studies that distinguish 
between motions dismissed for insufficient facts and for insufficient legal 
grounds find many cases before Twombly dismissed for insufficient facts.  
These findings should come as a surprise to researchers who point to the 
decision in Twombly as the death of notice pleading.  
Second, we believe that this fact-intense narrative pleading has arisen, 
in part, due to amendments to the Federal Rules that encourage greater judge 
involvement early in the case, as well as, early decisions about the possible 
narrowing of claims and the nature and breadth of discovery.  These early 
judicial decisions, often taking place at an initial scheduling conference with 
the federal judge and attorneys, encourage plaintiffs to set forth a coherent 
and plausible narrative at the outset, with sufficient facts to provide a context 
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to support the plaintiffs’ claims.  In reviewing such pleadings, federal judges 
rely on the narrative statements to make preliminary decisions about the 
strength of claims and the need for an amended complaint.  
Twombly and Iqbal pose a number of problems, but the solution is not 
to return to the pleading practices the day before Twombly was decided.  The 
uncertain manner in which judges might now rely on their judicial experience 
and common sense is a legitimate concern.  Still, in suggesting a return to 
practices in accord with a notice pleading standard, critics should be clear 
about the exact pleading practices and standards that they find suitable and 
indicate when, if ever, the litigants and federal courts employed such 
practices, and how their proposed solutions will accommodate recent 
amendments to the civil rules.  
It might still be too early to answer all of our questions.  The Conley 
standard stood for more than fifty years under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, though lower courts had formulated their own heightened 
pleading standards and litigants had engaged in narrative pleading practice 
before Twombly.  It is possible that future ramifications from Twombly and 
Iqbal have not yet come to fruition.  We are not just now “entering an age of 
storytelling pleading,”266 but, in fact, are already years into this new age.267  
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